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ABSTRACT
While the majority of linguistic theories concerned with semantic interpretation as-
sume some form of compositionality—the notion that the meaning of a complex expres-
sion comes from the meanings of its constituent parts and their structural arrangement—
several linguistic phenomena exist which seem to challenge (strict) compositionality on
both theoretical and empirical grounds. One such phenomena, termed complement coercion,
has gained considerable attention in psycholinguistic research in recent years, as these
constructions appear not only to involve a semantic type-mismatch, but also interpretive
properties which are not overtly expressed. Given recent arguments that the so-called
“coercion verbs” may not constitute a homogeneous set with respect to the processing
of coercion constructions, the present thesis conducts an experimental investigation into
the empirical validity of this claim, reporting evidence that appears to challenge it. The
findings that both aspectual and psychological verbs display evidence of complement
coercion are discussed in terms of their implications for competing hypotheses.
For my family: Tracy, Madison, and Rudy.
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Interpreting a sentence involves understanding the relations that hold between the
elements of which it is composed. To see how the lexical semantics of an element can
affect the larger meaning of a clause, consider the sentences in (1), which, despite their
surface similarity, give rise to importantly different meanings.
(1) a. The chef cooked the ravioli al dente.
b. The chef cooked the ravioli frozen.
While ostensibly alike, these sentences exhibit crucial differences that affect their interpre-
tations. In the resultative expression in (1-a), for example, the adjective phrase is causally
related to the action depicted by the verb—it is the action of cooking which causes the
ravioli to become al dente. No such causal relation holds between the adjective phrase
and verb in the depictive sentence in (1-b), however. Instead, the adjective phrase here
describes a state holding of the object, the ravioli, at the time the action described by
the verb is initiated, namely its being frozen. What these examples aim to show is that
there is more to the meaning of a sentence than its structure alone.1 While the sentences
in (1) appear syntactically the same, their distinct interpretations suggest the need for
investigating the interactions between the various components of grammar in order to
achieve a full theory of language comprehension.
In what follows, I will explore the notion of compositionality as it applies to natural
language, and the theoretical motivation behind it, reviewing some common mechanisms
for composing meaning in natural language (§1.2.1). In Chapter 2, I will discuss some
empirical challenges to compositionality (§2), such as the phenomena of linguistic coercion,
focusing on a subset thereof in Chapter 3, namely complement coercion, where I review how
1For a discussion of how these types of sentences may differ syntactically, see Bruening (2016).
2this apparent challenge to compositionality has been handled in formal linguistic theories
(§3.1). From here, I will review the empirical and psycholinguistic evidence regarding
the processing of complement coercion constructions (§3.2), before discussing the details
of a pilot study aimed at exploring potential differences in the processing of different
subclasses of the coercion verb set in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion
of the implications these empirical findings have for competing theoretical treatments.
1.1 Pragmatic inferencing
That interlocutors utilize world knowledge in order to integrate clausal interpretations
into a wider discourse context, resolve ambiguities, or identify discourse referents, is un-
controversial. This fact is well demonstrated by empirical findings of so-called “verbal
illusions” wherein comprehenders readily adopt pragmatically plausible interpretations
that conflict with the veridical meanings articulated by the grammar (Kracht 2007; Nat-
sopoulos 1985; Wason & Reich 1979).
To better illustrate this point, consider, for example, the so-called “Depth-Charge”
sentence, ‘No head injury is too trivial to be ignored’ (Wason & Reich 1979). More often
than not, this sentence receives an interpretation along the lines of ‘Regardless of how
unimportant it may seem, head injuries should always be treated,’ despite the fact that the
sentence logically paraphrases to something like ‘Regardless of how unimportant it may
seem, head injuries should always be ignored’ (Kracht 2007).
Barton and Sanford (1993) similarly found that in response to the question ‘After an
aircrash where should the survivors be buried?,’ half of participants answered something to
the effect of ‘Near their relatives’; and to the question ‘Can a man marry his widow’s sister?’
only 30% of participants noticed that in order to have a widow, the man would have to be
dead (Barton & Sanford 1993). Given what we know about the world, it is conceivable that
these interpretations are adopted on the basis of pragmatic plausibility; that is, in light of
real-world knowledge, it makes sense to ask whether a man can marry his wife’s sister if
his wife is dead.
Taken together, these findings suggest that linguistic input may be processed at dif-
fering depths, or in different ways, depending on the demands of the encounter—that is,
we may not always pay as close attention to, or be as interpretively constrained by, the
3logical form of an expression as one might suppose.2 For some researchers, findings like
these clearly constitute a challenge to the notion of compositionality (e.g., Ferreira et al.
(2002)). Still, given that language users are able to exploit the linguistic properties of an
utterances in order to discern subtle differences in meaning (such as those presented in (1)
above), or in order to figure out the meaning of a new utterance, it stands to reason that
some compositional mechanism must exist in the grammar. Whether such a mechanism
distinguishes linguistic and real-world knowledge remains an open question.
1.2 Compositionality
All languages share the capacity to combine meaningful units in order to express other
(more complex) meaningful units. Understanding how these meanings arise and how they
relate to an expression’s complexity constitutes one of the primary motivations behind the
principle of compositionality—a notion dating back at least to Frege (1882), and perhaps
most famously paraphrased by Barbara Partee, as in (2).
(2) “The meaning of an expression is a function of the meanings of its parts and the
way they are syntactically combined” (Partee 1984:153).
As stated, the principle makes no assumptions regarding what meaning is, or what consti-
tutes the parts of a complex expression; nor does it specify any restrictions on the means
by which these component parts are to be combined. While this vagueness is desirable
to some extent, as it allows for maximal generality while shielding against peremptory
assertions, abandoning all constraints on compositionality is also dangerous as it has the
effect of trivializing the notion: ultimately what we care about is not that language users
can ascribe something to a given expression of their language compositionally, but that they
can compositionally ascribe adequate meaning to that expression (Kracht 2007).3 Thus, for
any theory aiming at characterizing the semantic relations that do and do not hold between
syntactic elements, specification of the meanings of the basic building blocks of language
2See Baker and Wagner (1987) for a discussion of factors that may affect critical evaluation of linguistic
input.
3As Partee (1984:153) notes, without sufficient syntactic and lexical constraints, the principle of composi-
tionality is effectively vacuous.
4is prudent.
To complicate matters further, fixing the meaning of the principle itself is no easy task.
As Szabo´ (2012) points out, the principle of compositionality, as stated in (2), is ambiguous
in at least three ways: First, the phrase ‘is a function of’ could mean that the meaning of
a complex expression is fully determined by the meanings of its parts and the way they’re
arranged, or alternatively, it could simply assert the existence of a function which maps
the meanings of smaller constituents to that of the complex expression in which they occur
(Szabo´ 2012:5). The differences borne out by this distinction are subtle, but important. If
we assume the former interpretation of compositionality, the later is implicated, and the
result is that a given sentence Γ, where the meanings of its constituents and their structural
combination are held constant, will have a fixed interpretation. Alternatively, if we opt
for the latter understanding of ‘is a function of,’ it opens the possibility that there exist
different functions within the language for mapping the meanings and arrangement of Γ’s
constituents to the meaning of Γ. Intuitively, this alternative is somewhat weak as it would
allow for the meaning of a sentence to change compositionally, even when the meanings
of its constituents and the way they’re combined remains the same; yet, as it is stated in
(2), the principle of compositionality leaves room for either interpretation.
Another point of ambiguity regards the collective/distributive ambiguity demonstrated
by the plural definite description in the phrase ‘the meanings of its constituents’ (Szabo´
2012:7). The question here is whether this phrase should be understood as suggesting that
the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings that its constituents
have individually, or alternatively, of the meanings they have collectively. To illustrate this
point, Szabo´ presents the sentence ‘The wealth of a country is a function of the wealth of its
citizens’ (Szabo´ 2012:7). On the distributive reading, the sentence asserts that the wealth of
a country is fixed by the wealth of its individual citizens (a somewhat implausible notion).
On the other hand, the collective reading permits the wealth of a country to be understood
as a function of what its citizens own collectively.
This distinction may also prove useful in understanding the classic problem of co-
referring expressions, such as those in the sentence ‘The morning star is the evening star.’
If we treat the principle of compositionality distributively, the sentence should be un-
derstood as synonymous with the sentence ‘The morning star is the morning star,’ since
5in both cases (assuming the meanings of proper names is their referent), the individual
meaning of the constituents ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’ is the same: Venus.
However, if we think these sentences are not synonymous, we may prefer to opt for
a collective understanding of compositionality, in which the collective meanings of the
constituents go beyond the meanings of ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’ to include
some type of semantically encoded co-reference between the definite descriptions—that is,
where collective meaning is comprised of the individual meanings, along with whatever
meaning-relations hold between them (Szabo´ 2012:8). While arguments can be made in fa-
vor of both positions, what’s important for our purposes is acknowledging the alternative
ways in which the principle of compositionality may be construed.
A final point of ambiguity in the formulation of compositionality as presented in (2)
regards determining the appropriate antecedent for the pronoun ‘they’ (Szabo´ 2012:8).
Does the pronoun refer back to a complex expression’s parts (or constituents), or to the
meanings of its parts? If we opt for the latter understanding, we permit the possibility of two
sentences with the same syntactic structure and comprised of synonymous constituents to
have non-synonymous meanings—an option which the first reading does not allow. So,
for example, as competent language users, we know that the ‘red’ in red apple refers to the
outside of the apple, while the ‘pink’ in pink grapefruit refers to the inside of the grapefruit.
Thus, it appears we have complex expressions whose constituent meanings are integrated
in a way that differs from their lexical semantics, even though the mode of combination
appears to be the same (Szabo´ 2012:9). Insofar as we concede that the knowledge of which
part of the grapefruit is pink is part of linguistic knowledge, we may choose to opt for the
latter reading.
Still, despite these ambiguities and vagueness, the success with which the notion of
compositionality appears to capture certain intuitions about how linguistic systems work—
that is, as a feature of language, compositionality appears most capable of explaining the
productivity and systematicity of natural language—has led essentially every linguistic
theory concerned with semantic interpretation to assume its existence in some capacity.
The arguments behind this intuition are as follows:
• Competent language users are able to understand a complex expression γ that they’ve
never before encountered (indeed, it’s possible that anyone reading this thesis for
6the first time has never encountered this very sentence before, and yet has no trouble
comprehending it); thus, as competent language users, we must (at least implicitly)
have access to knowledge that lets us determine the meaning of γ without the need
for additional information.
– A related idea regards the unbounded nature of language: there exists an in-
finitely large set of complex expressions which we, as beings with finite memory
and finite computational power, could not possibly memorize, but nevertheless
have the capacity to understand.
• Similarly, the sentences language users understand display clear and predictable
patterns. If one is able to understand ‘The boy is happy’ and ‘The girl is sad,’ or ‘blue
house’ and ‘yellow car,’ it stands to reason that she will also be able to understand ‘The
boy is sad’ and ‘The girl is happy,’ or ‘yellow house’ and ‘blue car.’4
– Such arguments seem to apply equally well to the domain of productive mor-
phology: language users can create novel words by combining morphemes (for
example, open + -able→ openable, as in ‘That file is not openable on a Mac’), which
other speakers agree on the meaning of, suggesting that the meanings of new
words are derivable from the meanings of their component parts and the way
they’re put together.
Yet, while the intuition is relatively clear, how strictly compositionality is thought to
apply in natural language remains a source of debate. Montague (1970), for example,
assumes “strong compositionality” which is held to apply in the strictest sense, preserving
a homomorphic mapping between the syntactic and semantic components of the grammar
(Montague 1970). On this view, the meaning of an utterances is assumed to be fully
determined by the meanings of its parts and their structural arrangement. This is a very
powerful view of compositionality, and implies that interpretational mechanisms operate
strictly locally, attending only to the structure provided by the syntax, and accessing at
most the immediate subconstituents of a syntactic node. That is, the meaning obtained at
4Though of course the issue is more nuanced than this, as demonstrated by the ‘red apple’/‘pink grapefruit’
example above.
7any given syntactic node is seen as a function of that node’s immediate constituents and
their arrangement, such that every semantic process corresponds to some process in the
syntax. An illustration of this approach, as presented in Dowty (2007), is shown in (3)
below for the sentence ‘Fido barks.’
(3) meaning-of (SYNTACTIC-COMBINATION-OF(Fido, barks)) =
SEMANTIC-FUNCTION-OF(meaning-of (Fido), meaning-of (barks))
(Dowty 2007:11)
This constitutes the (more or less) standard view of strong compositionality, which Jack-
endoff (1997) refers to as “syntactically transparent semantic composition” and describes as
a system in which composition is driven by a syntactic structure that treats lexical items
as non-decompositional entities, reflecting at most a course semantic structure (Jackendoff
1997:48-49). Such an approach can have the effect of driving semantic theories toward
richer conceptions of meaning—if meaning cannot be discerned by looking deep into the
structure of a complex expression, then whatever relevant semantic information a given
expression carries must somehow be projected up to the level of the constituent it is a part
of (cf. the Sense Enumerative Lexicon approach discussed in §3.1.1).
Alternative views of semantic interpretation, however, resist these constraints on lo-
cality, and instead assume “weak compositionality” which maintains that operations for
syntactic combination may be associated with a richer semantics, but permits the possibil-
ity of non-structurally encoded semantic relations to contribute to the interpretation of a
complex expression compositionally. That is, such a view of compositionality allows for
purely semantic operations that don’t correspond to any syntactic processes (e.g., Partee
(1984); Partee & Rooth (1983)).
However, while distinguishing the strength of compositionality by the degree to which
it respects the constituent structure of an expression may be taken as the standard view, it’s
worth noting that there are conflicting attitudes regarding what is meant by ‘strong’ versus
‘weak’ compositionality. For example, though the hypothesis sketched above makes for
an elegant theory, Jackendoff (1997) and Pustejovsky (1991, 1995) argue that it cannot
be sustained without the loss of valuable generalizations regarding the expressiveness of
language (Jackendoff 1997:50). Instead, these authors opt for a view of strong composi-
8tionality that allows for a wider range of compositional operations which take advantage
of the internal structure of a lexical item’s “meta-entry”, or lexical conceptual paradigm
(LCP) (Pustejovsky 1995:62) (or lexical conceptual structure (LCS) (Jackendoff 1997:48)), in
addition to the syntactic arrangement of those elements. The notion of LCPs will be
explored in more detail in §3.1.3, but briefly, these can be thought of as the level of semantic
representation that incorporates properties of lexical item’s meaning which can be accessed
through operations such as semantic decomposition. Thus, while the Montegovian view
of strong compositionality sees LCPs as opaque to syntax, the Jackendoff/Pustejovskyan
view sees the interaction of LCPs and syntax as central to the (strong) composition of
meaning in natural language.
Moreover, ‘weak compositionality,’ according to the Jackendoff/Pustejovskyan view,
characterizes a system in which the only compositional mechanism available is function
application, thus requiring that the number of lexical entries for a given expression be com-
mensurate with the different contexts in which it occurs (cf., §3.1.1) (Pustejovsky 1995:59-
60). In other words, on this conceptualization, a weakly compositional system is unable
to generate distinct yet related senses of a lexical item from a single lexical entry. Specific
implementations of each of these systems will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
Whether natural language adheres to strong or weak compositionality will be taken
up further in Chapter 5, but for the time being, let it suffice to simply be aware of the
fact that different formalizations ascribe compositionality to language to differing degrees,
and that our evaluation of a system as strongly or weakly compositional will depend on
which characterization of strong versus weak compositionality is adopted. For the sake
of simplicity, I will assume the standard (Montegovian) view of compositionality moving
forward, unless otherwise specified. Before looking at phenomena that appear to challenge
strong compositionality (yet are consistent with weak compositionality), let us briefly
outline some rules of composition which are generally uncontroversial and standardly
taken to meet the requirements of strong compositionality.
1.2.1 Compositionality at work
The lexical meaning of a word in isolation is commonly viewed as being incomplete,
behaving as either an active functor or a passive argument (Pustejovsky 1995:1). This
9idea is reminiscent of Frege’s (1884) context principle, which holds that a word only has
meaning in the context of a proposition Janssen (1997). The meaning of the verb kiss, for
example, is incomplete without both a kisser, and a kissee, as shown in (4).
(4) a. John kissed Mary.
b. *John kissed.
c. *Kissed Mary.
This context-dependent meaning can be represented by inserting variables, which act as
place holders for arguments, into the word’s definition: for example, x kiss y. As such,
kiss behaves as a function which takes two arguments as its inputs and returns a fully
saturated proposition (which can be evaluated for truth conditionality) describing the
kissing of someone/something by someone/something as its output. Formally, this can
be expressed using the lambda calculus, as shown in (5).
(5) λyλx.kiss(x, y)
The semantic type of kiss, then, is a function from individuals (labeled ‘e’) to truth-values
(labeled ‘t’). According to Montague (1974), individuals and truth-values are ‘fully satu-
rated’ types (i.e., they cannot predicate over arguments) and constitute the basic ontology
of semantic types, from which all other types can be derived using the rule in (6).
(6) If α and β are semantic types, then < α, β > is also a semantic type.
Thus, in this system, kiss is of the derived type < e,< e, t >>, denoting a function
which applies to its arguments when the relationship between them is one of selection.
This is achieved by the work of the basic compositional rule of Function Application, defined
in (7) and illustrated by the tree in (8).











As shown in (8), when a function is applied to its syntactic sister, the variable bound by
the lambda term is replaced by the denotation of that sister, and the lambda is removed to
indicate that saturation of the predicate has occurred.
The idea behind function application is that one chunk of meaning (the predicate) has
(an) empty slot(s) in its meaning, and that composition with an argument consists in that
argument filling the predicate’s empty slot. But some kinds of structures—specifically,
modifiers—appear to require a different sort of compositional process. To illustrate this
need, consider the sentences in (9).
(9) a. Mary is beautiful.
b. Mary is a woman.
Both cases in (9) can be handled using simple function application since in both sentences,
‘Mary’ serves as the predicate’s argument, saturating the predicate to yield a proposition
which can be evaluated for truth conditionality. A problem arises, however, when we try
to compose a sentence such as (10).
(10) Mary is a beautiful woman.
Here, the whole constituent ‘a beautiful woman’ appears to be functioning as a predicate
for the argument ‘Mary’; however, this would suggest that the two predicates in (9) are
combining here to form a third predicate. Yet, nothing we’ve covered so far with function
application provides the tools necessary for understanding this—both ‘beautiful’ and ‘a
woman’ are of type < e, t > (i.e., they both take individuals (e) as input and return truth-
values (t) as their output), and thus should not be able to combine via saturation since
‘beautiful’ is not the right type of argument for ‘a woman’ and vice-versa; however, they do
somehow combine, and their product appears again to be of type < e, t >.
The question, then, seems to be one of how elements compose when their relationship
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is not one of selection. That is, how do the elements ‘beautiful’ and ‘woman’ compose to
create the constituent ‘beautiful woman’ which can then be applied to ‘Mary’?
In such a case, rather than treating ‘Mary’ as the missing argument of ‘beautiful’ (or
‘woman’), as in the predicate-saturation approach, the compositional rule of Predicate Mod-
ification (defined in (11)) is employed, which functions by contributing extra meaning to
an already potentially complete meaning. For the present example, application of this rule
will form an intersection between ‘womanness’ and ‘beautifulness,’ allowing the elements
to compose, as shown in the tree in (12).
(11) If α is a branching node, {β,γ} is the set of α’s daughters, and [[β]] and [[γ]] are both
of type < e, t >, then: [[α]] = λxe. [[β]](x) ∧ [[γ]](x) (Heim & Kratzer 1998)





Intersective modification can also be represented in the verbal domain using event-
based semantics, as proposed by Davidson (1967), which treats events as a fundamental
semantic concept and ontological primitive (Davidson 1967). The proposal is based on
observed entailment relations between sentences such as those in (13), where the truth of
(13-b) entails the truth of (13-a).
(13) a. Tim coughed.
b. Tim coughed loudly.
While meaning postulates might be invoked as a way of capturing these entailments (for
example, a rule stating something like ‘COUGH LOUDLY entails COUGH,’ or more formally,
∀x.∀y.COUGH2(x,y)→COUGH1(x)), Davidson argues that such an approach would only
serve as an ad hoc solution, and not a particularly useful one at that, since it would require
a potentially infinite number of meaning postulates to account for the potentially infinitely
complex pattern of entailments exemplified in language, and illustrated by his famous
butter example, shown in (14).
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(14) a. Jones buttered the toast.
b. Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom.
c. Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom with a knife.
d. Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom with a knife at midnight.
e. Jones buttered the toast slowly, deliberately, in the bathroom, with a knife, at
midnight.
Contrasting this with an absence of such an entailment relation between sentences such as
those presented in (15), Davidson argued for the need for a more logically complex way of
expressing events than traditional treatments permitted.
(15) a. Tim coughed five minutes ago.
b. Tim coughed two minutes ago.
On his view, predicates are analyzed as containing one or more additional argument slot(s)
which take existentially quantified event variables, as illustrated in (16).
(16) a. ∃e.cough(e, tim)
b. ∃e.cough(e, tim) ∧ loud(e)
Using this formalization, it is easy to see that the representation in (16-a) follows from
(16-b), while no such entailment holds between the sentences in (15) since these sentences
express different events.
Of course, not all cases of modification should be treated as intersective (e.g., an ‘alleged
criminal’ is not necessarily a ‘criminal’)—a fact which seems to imply a need for yet addi-
tional compositional mechanisms. Relative clause constructions provide an illustrative
example of this since they behave semantically as modifiers despite the fact that their
surface syntax resembles that of a sentence. Consider the example in (17).
(17) John kissed the woman who baked the cake.
For the sentence in (17) to be assigned a value of true, the individual kissed by ‘John’ must
both have the property of being a woman and also of baking a cake. This can be repre-
sented if the modifying relative clause ‘who baked the cake’ is transformed into something
of type < e, t >, taking ‘woman’ as its argument via predicate modification (ignoring event
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variables for ease of explication). Luckily, the compositional rule of Predicate Abstraction
(PA) provides the necessary tools for achieving just such a transformation.
(18) λx.woman(x) ∧ bake(a cake, x) (via PM)
woman
λy.woman(y)
λx.bake(a cake, x) (via PA*)
λx bake(a cake, x) (via FA)
x
bake a cake
As shown in the tree in (18), the rule of predicate abstraction transforms the relative
clause into a predicate by inserting an abstraction operator that binds a free variable within
the formula. The resulting predicate is then capable of taking an individual as its argu-
ment, effectively expressing that the object denoted by that individual argument has the
property of being such that the predicate resulting from abstraction applies to them (in this
case, the property of having baked the cake).
While these rules of composition offer broad empirical coverage, they in no way ex-
haust the entire inventory of possible compositional operations. And indeed, several
linguistic phenomena exist which seem to require more powerful mechanisms for com-
positionality. Such examples have been seen as genuine (though not necessarily insur-




Apparent counterexamples to compositionality come in the form of complex expres-
sions whose meaning appears to hinge on something beyond just the meanings of its
constituents and their structural relation. Such cases often involve a clash between ex-
pressions of different semantic types which need to combine, but whose type-clash cannot
be resolved using the compositional machinery sketched above. Nevertheless, evidence
that conflicting types may still compose to yield a coherent interpretation is shown by the
simple case of sentences with quantificational elements.
2.1 Composition with quantifiers
So far, we have discussed predicates as functions which take individuals as their input
and return truth values as their output. Given that quantified noun-phrases (NPs) like
‘every cat’ readily combine with predicates (e.g., ‘Every cat purrs’), we might be tempted to
treat quantifier phrases as individuals (as with ‘Fluffy purrs’); however, such an approach
seems to get the meanings of the quantified sentence wrong. Consider, for example, pred-
ications of weight: if ‘every cat’ were treated as an (e-type) individual, the sentence ‘Every
cat weighs 25lbs’ would seem to suggest that the entity denoted by ‘every cat’—i.e., the set of
all cats in the domain of discourse—weighs 25lbs, when in fact, the predication seems only
to apply to individual cats within the set of cats restricted by the quantificational domain
(Sauerland & von Stechow 2001). Thus, to obtain the correct interpretive predictions, we
treat the quantifier phrase (QP) not as an individual input to some function, but instead
as a function which selects two predications of individuals as input: one restricting the
quantificational domain, and another attributing some property to the individuals within
that domain. An example of this approach is presented in (1).
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This approach works for quantified subjects, but unfortunately, a problem arises when it







As (2) illustrates, there is again a type-mismatch between the verb and its QP object.
The lexical semantics of ‘every’ requires its second argument to be of type 〈e, t〉, yet recall
that kiss is of type 〈e, 〈e, t〉〉. In light of this issue, two alternative solutions have been put
forth. The first solution is semantic in nature and involves the application of a rule for
shifting the type of the QP into a ‘higher type,’ as illustrated in (3).
(3) [[Every]]basic type = λP〈e,t〉.λQ〈e,t〉.∀x[P(x)→Q(x)]→
[[Every]]li f ted type = λP〈e,t〉.λQ〈e,〈e,t〉〉.∀x[P(x)→Q(x)]
The second solution resolves the mismatch via movement of the QP in the syntax through
the operation of Quantifier Raising (QR), which effectively generates an abstract predicate
of the suitable type as the object moves out of the VP (Heim & Kratzer 1998). While
distinguishing between these alternatives is beyond the scope of the present thesis, the
point to take from this discussion is that in either case, additional operations are needed in
order to model the composition of quantified objects adequately.
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2.2 More evidence for type-shifting
Type-shifting operations also prove useful in the domain of conjunction. Given that
NPs can either be higher-order functions, such as QPs, or simple individuals, such as
names or definite noun phrases, we might expect combining the two under conjunction to
yield a type-mismatch and block composition; however, as the sentences in (4) illustrate,
such a composition is not blocked.
(4) a. The coach and at least two players attended the meeting.
b. John and all of his friends went to the movies.
Solutions for resolving this mismatch come in two flavors. The first, following Montague
(1970), treats noun phrases uniformly as higher-type predicates (otherwise known as gen-
eralized quantifiers (GQ)) of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉. This effectively reverses the order of function
application, such that names and definite NPs, rather than being represented as individual
members of sets over which certain predications hold (as is the case when predicates take
individual e-type arguments as their input), under the GQ approach, are instead treated
as denoting sets of sets of properties denoted by the predicates. An illustration of how this
treatment (shown in (5-b)) differs from the function application approach (shown in (5-a))














The second approach is similar to the GQ approach in allowing NPs to be of the higher-
type; however, this approach maintains the option for treating NPs as e-type individuals
as well, and employs a semantic type-lifting operation as a last resort repair mechanism
to shift the type of e-type NPs only when necessary, thereby dispensing with the homo-
morphic syntax-semantics mapping (and hence, strong compositionality) assumed by the
Montagovian approach (Partee & Rooth 1983).
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2.3 Coercion in linguistics
Another example of the interpretational system’s ability to overcome apparent clashes
between expressions of different semantic types is exemplified by the phenomena of ‘lin-
guistic coercion.’ The term coercion, originally adopted from the computer sciences, has
been applied to a range of linguistic phenomena that involve type-mismatches and meaning-
shifts in composition (Jackendoff 1997; Moens & Steedman 1988; Pustejovsky 1991). This
includes Aktionsart mismatches, such as those presented in (6).
(6) a. Tim is hiccuping.
b. Julian was running a mile.
c. Julian was running a mile last week. This week he is up to three.
As (6) illustrates, when the progressive auxiliary (-ing), which normally requires its ar-
gument to be a process or activity (i.e., ongoing), is instead combined with a non-process,
such as a semelfactive (which by definition cannot be predicated as ongoing), the argument
may still be coerced into an activity through iteration, as shown in (6-a). Similarly, when
combined with a culminating process, the argument can again be coerced into an activity,
either by “stripping off” the culmination, as it were (6-b), or through iteration, (6-c) (Bott
2010:39).
The classification of Aktionsarten was originally motivated by the observation that
different verbs and verb phrases refer to different kinds of eventualities in the world.
Vendler (1957, 1967), for example, proposed a four-way taxonomy for distinguishing lex-
ical aspect, which includes STATES (characterized as non-dynamic situations, e.g., ‘Eric
loves Tim.’, ‘Tim is happy.’); ACTIVITIES (which involve open-ended, or non-culminating,
processes describing events that are extended in time, but which are not associated with
any particular conclusion or end-point. These are often combined with ‘for-adverbials,’
e.g., ‘Jim and Derick played video games for an hour.’); ACCOMPLISHMENTS (which involve
telic processes that also extend in time but which have natural end-points or culminations
that are associated with a change in the state of things. These are typically good with
‘in-adverbials,’ but not with ‘for-adverbials,’ e.g., ‘Scotty wrote a song in 20 minutes.’, ‘Eric
built the house (in six months).’); and ACHIEVEMENTS (which involve instantaneous changes
in the state of things. These are typically good with the perfective, e.g., ‘Tim has reached the
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top.’, ‘Eric (has) died.’ ) (Vendler 1957, 1967). Smith (1991) extends this typology to include
a fifth lexical class: SEMELFACTIVES, which involve punctual, instantaneous events that do
not result in a change in the state of things (e.g., ‘Tairy Greene knocked on the door.’, ‘Dr. Brule
hiccuped.’) (Smith 1991).
The appeal of such a taxonomy is that it suggests that part of an utterance’s meaning
involves one of just a few possible aspectual or temporal profiles which can be modeled
as states within a finite-state automation or transition network, allowing for Aktionsart
mismatches, or ‘aspectual coercions’ to be represented as transitions between these states
(Moens & Steedman 1988:13).
Similar phenomena have also been identified in the nominal domain where mismatches
between count and mass specifications often seem to invoke coercive mechanisms (Link
1983; Pustejovsky 1991). The nouns ‘water’ and ‘beer,’ for example, denote substances
which usually behave as mass nouns (as in ‘She drinks water’); however, when combined
with the indefinite article as in (7), the interpretation of the NPs is shifted to the count
domain where they are understood as objects.
(7) I’ll have a water and a beer.
The distinction between substances (or “stuff”) and objects (or “things”) is further illus-
trated by the sentences in (8-a) and (8-b). As originally observed by Link (1983), given the
premise ‘My ring is 100% gold,’ it follows that ‘my ring’ and ‘the gold in my ring’ are phys-
ically identical; yet both sentences in (8-a) and (8-b) can be true despite their conflicting
predications, suggesting that the “thing” denoted by ‘my ring’ and the “stuff” denoted by
‘the gold in my ring’ are in fact not the same (Link 1983).
(8) a. My ring isn’t very old.
b. The gold in my ring is very old.
Yet, as shown in (9) (Asher 2015:67, ex.2), in some cases, both “thing” and “stuff” entities
may give rise to the same expression.
(9) a. John brought a bottle. It had a nice label./ It was yummy.
b. John brought a bottle. It had a nice label and was yummy.
c. John touched the bottle, which had been so yummy.
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Example (9-a), for instance, offers two possible continuations for the first sentence, each of
which contains the pronoun ‘it.’ Interestingly, it appears that the discourse referent made
available by the first sentence changes depending on which continuation is chosen. In the
first continuation, the pronoun refers back to the bottle as a container (object/thing), while
in the second, it refers back to the bottle’s contents (substance/stuff).
From the perspective of semantic type theory and selectional restrictions, ‘bottle’ in-
tuitively types as a physical object or container, which predicates like ‘has a nice label’
can straightforwardly apply to. Assuming an element’s type-specifications are preserved
through anaphor binding, then, the pronoun in the first continuation of (9-a) is of the
right type to satisfy the selectional requirements of the predicate. In the second contin-
uation, however, the predicate ‘yummy’ selects for arguments denoting potable/palatable
substances—which ‘bottle’ (as a physical object/container1) does not. Hence, in this case,
the type of ‘bottle’ is coerced into the type of its contents, with which ‘yummy’ can then com-
bine. Interestingly, as (9-b) and (9-c) illustrate, with coercions of this type, both container
(default) and content (coerced) denotations for the discourse referent in the first sentence
appear available.
A similar phenomena can be seen in the case of ambiguous process/result nominals
such as construction. For example, as illustrated in (10), a sentence may make reference to
either the ‘process’ sense of the noun (10-a) or to its ‘result’ sense (10-b), or even to both at
the same time (10-c) (Pustejovsky 1995:94).
(10) a. The construction was arduous and tedious. (Process)
b. The construction is standing on the next street. (Result)
c. The house’s construction was finished in two months. (Process & Result)
(Pustejovsky 1995:94)
This is not the case with other types of linguistic coercion, however, such as selectional co-
ercion (a.k.a. “complement coercion”), where the denotation of a coerced element appears
to be permanently altered. The phenomena of complement coercion constitutes the focus
of the remainder of this thesis and is outlined in the next chapter, followed by a review of
1Assuming it’s not made of chocolate or some other comestible substance.
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Up to now, we have primarily focused the discussion of selection in terms of predicates
which take individuals as their arguments; however, some predicates, such as aspectual
verbs like ‘begin’ and ‘finish,’ as well as psychological verbs like ‘enjoy’ and ‘prefer,’ appear
instead to select for other verb phrases (VPs), as illustrated by the sentences in (1).
(1) a. Alice began to read the book.
b. Sebastian finished writing the article.
c. Napoleon enjoyed running in the park.
d. Delilah preferred to walk to school.
In (1), the predicates ‘begin’ and ‘finish’ behave as functions which select for verbal de-
scriptions of events as input, and return predications over incremental subparts (begin
→ ‘initial subpart’; finish → ‘final subpart’) of those events as output. The predicates
‘enjoy’ and ‘prefer’ in (1) similarly select for verbal descriptions of events, and express a
mapping relation between a psychological state holding of the experiencer and the action
described by the complement.1 As such, we might expect combination of these predicates
with non-eventive objects to result in ungrammaticality. However, as the sentences in (2)
indicate, this prediction would be false:
(2) a. Alice began the book.
b. Sebastian finished the article.
c. Halle enjoyed the hamburger.
These examples are particularly interesting as they appear to involve not only a type-
mismatch between elements that need to compose, but also interpretive properties which
1What Nissenbaum (1985) refers to as “the emotional episode” (Pesetsky 1996:56).
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are not expressed syntactically. That is, (2-a) and (2-b) seem to be interpreted along the
lines of (1-a) and (1-b), respectively, which is problematic for strong compositionality since
their explicit morphosyntax ([NP[V[NP]]]) does not make reference to an event, yet the
only coherent interpretation demands that there be one. Comprehenders must somehow
infer, add, or access information regarding what kind of activity the agent was engaged in,
such that an eventive interpretation can be imposed on the (otherwise non-eventive) com-
plement.2 This process has been termed ‘complement coercion,’ and is typically viewed as
a mechanism of conflict resolution on the idea that the non-eventive complement must be
coerced, type-shifted, or reinterpreted in order to comply with the selective restrictions of
the verb (Pustejovsky 1995:59).
Obviously, such a characterization relies on the assumption that the so-called “com-
plement coercion verbs” do in fact select for eventive complements (an issue which will
be addressed in §3.1.3). However, as Levin and Rappaport Hovav (2005) caution, there
is usually more than one possible way of classifying most verbs, and “failure to classify
verbs in terms of the appropriate semantic elements may give rise to spurious problems
regarding the lexical semantics-syntax interface” (Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005:12). To
illustrate this point, consider the example (borrowed from Levin and Rappaport Hovav,
2005, 12-13) of unnacusativity and auxiliary selection in Italian.
Unaccusative and unergative verbs were first classified by Perlmutter (1978) using
references to particular semantic classes of the verbs. Verbs such as snore, cough, sneeze
and yawn, for example, which are semantically characterized as ‘verbs of bodily process,’
were classified by Perlmutter as unergative verbs, expected to take the auxiliary avere
‘have,’ while unnaccusative verbs were analyzed as taking the auxiliary essere ‘be’ (see
Rosen, 1981, and Burzio, 1986, for similar arguments linking auxiliary selection to unnac-
cusativity). However, the verb arrossire ‘blush’ presented a problem for this analysis since
it denotes a bodily process, yet selects for essere instead of avere. In light of this observation,
McClure (1990) argued that the semantic characterization of ‘verbs of bodily process’ was
2Note that this process does not seem to be necessary when the complement is a so-called ‘event nominal’
(i-a), or derived nominal (i-b), as illustrated in (i).
(i) a. The man began the fight.
b. The man began fighting.
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inappropriate for generalizations regarding the lexical semantics-syntax interface, and in-
stead proposed that the rule governing auxiliary selection in Italian was sensitive to the
notion of ‘change of state’—activity verbs select for avere, while achievement verbs select
for essere (Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005:12-13).3
What cases like this remind us is that it is not always clear, a priori, which lexical seman-
tic factors are grammatically relevant—that is, which properties of a lexical item’s seman-
tics will matter for argument realization. And indeed, many of the verbs that have been
identified in the literature as participating in complement coercion phenomena have also
enjoyed stimulating histories of reanalysis after challenging certain predictions made on
the basis of other activity predicates.4 With this caution in mind, let’s look at the comple-
ment coercion verb set, identified in the literature by virtue of the diagnostic of predicate
plus entity-denoting complement giving rise to an eventive interpretation (Pustejovsky
1991:424). These verbs fall roughly into the following three semantic classes:
• aspectual verbs: begin, finish, continue, complete, start, end
• psychological verbs: endure, enjoy, tolerate, resist, prefer, survive
• other5 verbs: attempt, try, expect, permit, master
Data from psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic investigations into the processing of
complement coercion sentences featuring this set of verbs have consistently shown evi-
dence of a computational cost, or processing difficulty, emerging during the on-line read-
ing of coercion sentences as compared with that of non-coercive sentences (Husband et al.
2011; McElree et al. 2001). Before reviewing this evidence in detail, I would first like
to explore the various theoretical proposals that have been put forth in the literature to
account for complement coercion phenomena, in hopes of establishing a better grasp of
3The difficulty of predicting syntactic behavior on the basis of semantic classification is also illustrated by
ergative case assignment in Hindi for verbs of bodily/sound emission (Poornima & Koenig 2009).
4This especially applies to psychological verbs (cf. Baker’s (1988) UTAH) but is also true of aspectual
predicates (see, for example Dowty 1987, 1991).
5Although some of these verbs fall into the ‘try’ class which includes verbs denoting effort toward the
achievement or culmination of some process/activity (Schuler 2005), most of the verbs in the ‘try’ class do not
exhibit complement coercion behavior (for example, aim, seek, strive), and thus collectively, this group of verbs
does not lend itself straightforwardly to analysis as a homogeneous set.
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the computational factors that may be contributing to the comprehension of these con-
structions.
3.1 Theoretical treatments
Numerous attempts at accounting for complement coercion phenomena composition-
ally, and within a larger theory of linguistic competence, have been made. In what follows,
I will provide a coarse overview of some of these formal treatments, noting some advan-
tages and disadvantages of each.
3.1.1 Sense Enumerative Lexicon
One way of handling this apparent violation of compositionality might be to posit
distinct lexical entries for the different verb senses, thus reflecting their differences in se-
lectional behavior compositionally (see Brugman (1988) for an example of this approach).
Indeed, in many linguistic frameworks, lexical ambiguity is represented by reference to
distinct entries and word senses for an ambiguous expression. So, for example, we might
posit a BEGIN1 which selects for eventive complements (John began reading), and a BEGIN2
which selects for entity complements (John began the book)6. However, there are several
reasons for rethinking this approach as a way of rescuing strong compositionality, or even
simply accounting for complement coercion phenomena.
For one, systems that appeal to a Sense Enumerative Lexicon (SEL) as a way of handling
ambiguity do not distinguish lexical items that accidentally share the same form despite
having distinct or unrelated meanings (homonomy), from items whose senses are logically
related (e.g., the process/result senses of ‘construction’ discussed in §2.3). Thus, while such
a system can capture homonomy, or “accidental polysemy” (Pustejovsky 1995), it cannot
capture the nature of related but distinct word senses without being supplemented with
additional mechanisms, such as meaning postulates. Moreover, for an SEL approach to
account for creative uses of words in novel contexts which extend their senses, it would
also need to be supplemented with some kind of mechanism or system for generating
new word senses. Thus, while it seems to adhere to strong compositionality insofar as
respecting the constituent structure of a given sentence, it is only weakly compositional in
6Though it is not clear, at least to me, what the “non-eventive” meaning of ‘John began the book’ would be.
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the Jackendoff/Pustejovkyan sense, since it requires as many distinct representations for a
word as there are linguistic contexts that it appears in, missing generalizations about how
different word sense might be related, and only capturing the expressiveness of language
in a post-hoc manner (Pustejovsky 2011:1404). Indeed, given the pervasiveness of poly-
semy in natural language, it’s not difficult to imagine how unwieldy certain computations
could become in an SEL system (e.g., combining two polysemous expressions, each with
n number of different senses, would result in n × n possible meanings), running us into
a similar problem as employing meaning postulates to account for (potentially infinitely
complex) entailment relations between eventualities—an undesirable state for a computa-
tionally tractable system.
SEL approaches to lexical ambiguity also leave us in an undesirable state of circularity
with regard to interpretation, since understanding the meaning of a complex expression
would then entail first knowing which sense of a given word is in play—the determination
of which may itself depend on understanding the meaning of the larger expression in
which it occurs. Finally, this type of approach has also been criticized for its failure to
account for the fact that in most (if not all) cases of complement coercion, it seems to
be the object converting its sense in order to satisfy the verb, not the other way around
(Pustejovsky 2011:1404). Consider the examples in (3), (borrowed from Pustejovsky 1995,
88), where the most natural interpretations for the verb ‘enjoy’ seem to be constrained by
properties commonly associated with the NP complements.
(3) a. Mary enjoyed the movie last night. (watching)
b. John enjoys his morning coffee. (drinking)
c. Bill enjoyed Steven King’s last book. (reading) (Pustejovsky 1995:88)
While there may be numerous ways of enjoying something, the interpretations elicited
by these examples seem to be parameterized by information related to the particular com-
plements (e.g., ‘watching a movie,’ ‘drinking coffee,’ and ‘reading a book’). Still, some
theorists argue that while understanding the particular event the agent in these sentences
is engaged in may depend on our knowledge of activities commonly associated with the
NP complements, it does not necessarily follow that this knowledge is contained within
our lexical representations of those NPs, and instead may only be determined at an extra-
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linguistic level of processing due to pragmatic inferences. Examples of such theories will
be examined in what follows.
3.1.2 Structural gap
In light of the intimate connection between coerced interpretations and a verb’s se-
lectional force, we might be tempted to seek out a syntactic explanation for complement
coercion phenomena—and indeed, such proposals have been made. For example, de
Almeida and Dwivedi (2004, 2008) utilize the notion of syntactically active “null” elements
(Chomsky 1981), arguing that coercion effects result from structural gaps in the coercing
predicates, which license pragmatic inferences. The proposal extends Susi Wurmbrand’s
(2001, 2004) treatment of German ‘restructuring verbs’ to account for English complement
coercion phenomena, based on an observed overlap between the verbs in the set of English
“coercion verbs” and German restructuring verbs, which include try and begin.7 On Wurm-
brand’s account, German restructuring predicates involve complex verbal structures, as
illustrated in (4), which have an extra VP that lacks both tense and a complementizer















‘since John tried to repair the tractor’

















(de Almeida & Dwivedi 2008:314; from Wurmbrand, 2001, p.17 )
Applying this treatment to English, de Almeida and Dwivedi argue that (5-a) is struc-
turally simpler than (5-b), which on their treatment has a structure analogous to (5-c),
containing an extra VP with an empty verbal head (de Almeida & Dwivedi 2008:313).
(5) a. The secretary typed the memo.
b. The secretary began the memo.
c. The secretary began [VP[V0 e][NP the memo]]
The additional structure attributed to this class of verbs is also taken to account for their
ability to select VP complements. For example, the sentence ‘The secretary began to type the
memo’ has the same structure as its coercive counterpart in (5-c), except that in this case,














(de Almeida & Dwivedi 2008:315)
On this view, the only information encoded in a lexical item is its denotation. Thus, when
an overt VP complement is not selected (i.e., the environment for complement coercion),
interpretation of the specific activity in question is left open to pragmatic inferencing, and
is not thought to be contained in our semantic representation of the sentence (de Almeida
& Dwivedi 2008:323). This has the effect of maintaining classic compositionality which
assumes no need for positing extra-syntactic processes.
Yet, while this account may be appealing from the standpoint of classic composition-
ality, and insofar as it attempts to offer a more principled reason for treating the so-called
“coercion verbs” as a homogeneous set, it appears to make the wrong predictions in several
cases. For example, as argued by Pylkka¨nen and McElree (2006), who consider a very
similar VP-insertion approach, if coercion verbs in fact have the structure in (5-c), then
VP-modifiers should have two available attachment sites; however, as the examples in (7)
show, only the higher position (7-a) is available for coercion constructions.
(7) a. We finished eating the meal slowly.
b. We finished the meal slowly.
c. I started cutting a loaf of bread with a knife.
d. #I started a loaf of bread with a knife.
(Pylkka¨nen & McElree 2006:34)
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In the fully saturated VP examples in (7-a) and (7-c), both VP positions are available for
modification. For example, (7-a) is true in the event of a slow meal, or ‘eating a meal
slowly,’ coming to an end quickly, and similarly, (7-c) is true if an event of cutting the
loaf of bread with a knife was initiated. In the case of (7-b) and (7-d), however, which
supposedly contain an empty verbal head, only the higher VP is available for modification.
In other words, (7-b) is false if a slow meal comes to an end quickly (‘the meal slowly’
cannot be a constituent), and (7-d) is false if an event of cutting a loaf of bread with a knife
was initiated—the knife must be an instrument of the initiation (Pylkka¨nen & McElree
2006:34).8
Similarly, assuming the structure in (5-c), we cannot explain why these purported
restructuring verbs display different behavior with respect to passivization when they
express an overt VP complement compared to when they contain only an empty V head
(Pylkka¨nen & McElree 2006:35). For example, as shown in (8), when no overt VP comple-
ment is expressed (i.e., in the coercion environment), passivization is grammatical (8-a).
However, when an overt VP complement is present, passivization seems to be blocked, as
shown in (8-b).
(8) a. The article was finished by the editor.
b. *The article was finished to be read/reading by the editor.
Maintaining this account, then, seems to amount to positing extra structure which
behaves as if it is not present in certain environments. Given these obvious deficiencies,
the Structural-Gap hypothesis appears less than adequate as a way of account for English
complement coercion phenomena. In the subsections to follow, we will consider how more
semantically-focused treatments of complement coercion fare.
3.1.3 Coercion as type-shifting
By far the most common way of handling complement coercion phenomena has been
to adopt semantic mechanisms for shifting the meaning of the entity-denoting NP into an
eventive one. For the purposes of this discussion, I will focus on two slightly different
8While it is theoretically possible that phonologically null verbal heads cannot be modified (at least in
English), the authors reach the opposite conclusion, arguing that both positions should be available for
modification (de Almeida & Dwivedi 2008:317).
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versions of the type-shifting approach: Pustejovsky’s (1991, 1995) “Generative Lexicon”
approach, and Jackendoff’s (1997) “Enriched Composition” approach.
3.1.3.1 Generative Lexicon
On the Generative Lexicon (GL) approach, complement (or “type”) coercion is defined
as “[a] semantic operation that converts an argument to the type that is expected by a
function, where it would otherwise result in a type error” (Pustejovsky 1991:425). This
approach assumes that coercion is ubiquitous in natural language, and embraces a rel-
atively rich typology for modeling different kinds of linguistic coercions compositionally
(Pustejovsky 1995, 1991). On this view, lexical representations are seen as highly structured
entities that are minimally decomposed into an Argument structure, an Event structure, a
Qualia structure, and an Inheritance structure (Pustejovsky 1995:4).
The Inheritance structure situates a lexical item’s type within a type lattice, where
entailments between types (for example LIQUID → PHYSICAL) are represented, allowing
higher types to be inherited through the operation of subtyping, described below (Puste-
jovsky 1995:63). The Argument structure refines the traditional argument/adjunct distinc-
tion, distinguishing the following four types of arguments for lexical items (Pustejovsky
1995:65):
• True arguments:9 which are syntactically realized (e.g., ‘John arrived late’).
• Default arguments:10 which are not necessarily expressed syntactically, but which
are part of the logical expression of the sentence (e.g., ‘John built the house (out of bricks)’).
• Shadow arguments: which are semantically incorporated into the logical expression
of the lexical item, but can only be expressed syntactically via operations of subtyp-
9This is the domain generally covered by Chomsky’s (1981) Theta-criterion.
10Default arguments may be expressed via a prepositional phrase as in (i-a), or as a phrase incorporated into
a true argument, as in (i-b). When this happens, the material is able to be expressed as a shadow argument, as
in (i-c).
(i) a. Mary built a house with wood.
b. Mary built a wooden house.
c. Mary built a wooden house out of pine. (Pustejovsky 1995:65)
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ing or discourse specification (e.g., ‘Mary buttered her toast with an expensive butter /
*with butter’).
• True Adjuncts: which may modify the logical expression but are not necessarily part
of the situational interpretation, nor tied to any particular item’s semantic represen-
tation (e.g., ‘Mary visited the park on Tuesday’).
The Event structure extends the Davidsonian and Vendlerian approaches discussed
above, expressing events and their types as well as ordering relations over them, and
specifying which part of an event (e.g., process, state, culmination) a given lexical item
is focusing (Pustejovsky 1995:73). In this way, the Event structure, along with the Inheri-
tance and Argument structures, can be seen as parameters which constrain the more cen-
trally defined semantics of a lexical item, as presented in its Qualia structure (Pustejovsky
1995:68).
It is the Qualia structure which provides the lexical item’s “relational force,” and com-
prises information relating to a word’s deeper conceptual associations (Pustejovsky 1995:76).
These Qualia structures may contain, for example, information about a word’s formal (tax-
onomic), constitutive (part-of or made-of relation), telic (used-for or functions-as relation),
or agentive (origin, created-by relation) properties (Pustejovsky 1991). During the course of
composition, information contained in a lexical item’s Qualia structure may be accessed,
exploited, or augmented by virtue of four different compositional mechanisms (parame-
terized by the Argument, Event, and Inheritance structures):
1. Pure selection or type matching applies when the type needed by a function is directly
fulfilled by the type of its argument (e.g., in the sentence ‘The rock fell.’ “fall” is of
type PHYS→t, and “the rock” is of type PHYS, so no type adjustment is needed before
function application can straightforwardly apply, yielding fall(the-rock) (Pustejovsky
2011:1412)).
2. Accommodation or subtyping applies when the type needed by a function is inherited
by the argument (e.g., in the sentence ‘Some water fell on the floor,’ “water” is of type
LIQUID, which is a subtype of PHYS; here, accommodation subtyping can apply,
shifting the type of “water” to PHYS, and allowing function application to apply
as before, yielding fall(some-water) (Pustejovsky 2011:1414)).
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3. Type coercion applies when the type needed by a function is not directly satisfied by
the type of its argument, nor inherited via a subtype relation, but is instead imposed
on the argument by one of two strategies:
(a) either via introduction (CI), where the argument is “wrapped” with the type
needed by the function (e.g., in the sentence ‘The water spoiled,’ “spoil” is an
artifactual predicate of type PHYS ⊗T11 τ → t, while “water,” which is of type
LIQUID, is from the subdomain of natural entities (eN). In this case, subtyping
must first apply, converting the type of “water” into the type PHYS. Coercion
by introduction can then apply to introduce a telic (τ) value for “water,” giving
it the type PHYS ⊗T τ, at which point function application can apply, yielding
spoil(the-water) (Pustejovsky 2011:1417)).
(b) or via exploitation (CE-Q), where the function is satisfied by taking part of the
arguments type (via its Qualia structure). Since this is the relevant operation for
complement coercion, a full derivation is provided below.
To help illustrate how composition might proceed in the case of complement coercions,
consider the derivation12 in (9) for the sentence ‘Alice enjoyed her coffee’:
(9) VP:λx∃e[drink(e, x, her-coffee)] (CE-Q)
V
enjoy






When ‘enjoy,’ which in this system is of type EVENT→ (eN → t), attempts to compose with
‘her coffee,’ which is of type LIQUID ⊗T DRINK (via GQ type shifting, where ⊗T indicates
a complex type with a telic force), a type-mismatch occurs. This type-mismatch then
triggers the repair mechanism of Coercion by Introduction which applies the type EVENT to
11Where ⊗ indicates a type-constructing operator which adds a qualia relation to the lexical head’s type.
Here, the subscript T indicates that it is the TELIC qualia role being added (Pustejovsky 2011:1408).
12Adapted from Pustejovsky, 2011, p.1422, example 55. For example derivations of other types of coercion,
see Pustejovsky (2011).
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LIQUID ⊗T DRINK, shifting ‘her coffee’ into an event. At this point, Coercion by Exploitation
applies, extracting the value ‘drink’ from the object’s qualia structure and binding it to the
predicate P. Finally, the constituent is of the right type for standard function application to
apply, saturating ‘enjoy’ and yielding λy.enjoy(y, λx∃e.drink(e, x, her-coffee)) (Pustejovsky
2011:1422).
Thus, in this system, the qualia structure encodes properties associated with nouns and
NPs, and in turn provides coercing verbs with the information necessary for construing the
contextualized eventive interpretations characteristic of complement coercion sentences.
This has the effect of reducing the size of the lexicon (as compared to an SEL approach)
by conflating distinct but related word senses into a single lexical entry, allowing for
generalizations about related word senses to be captured in a way that having each sense
lexically specified does not (Pustejovsky 1995:62). This also has the effect of allowing
arguments in subject position, in addition to those in complement position, to contribute
to the interpretation of coerced expressions. For example, differences in the contextualized
meanings of the verb ‘read’ in (10) below can be explained in terms of different qualia roles
being exploited—the telic role in (10-a) and the agentive role in (10-b).
(10) a. The student finished the book. (reading)
b. The author finished the book. (writing)
Yet, while this approach is has the advantage of being able to model a wide range of
different linguistic coercions compositionally, as well as being able to account for distinct
but related senses of a given lexical item, the system is highly flexible and may be at risk
of overgenerating unattested structures (for instance, ‘*John began the contact lenses’ may be
generated if the telic role of the NP—something like ‘wearing’—is exploited). Similarly,
while this system attempts to specify the activity relating the verb and its argument(s)
by positing more richly structured lexical representations, it offers no obvious way of
distinguishing analytic information (i.e., information true by virtue of linguistic content)
from synthetic information (i.e., general world knowledge or private/shared beliefs) in
order to discern what information is contained in a lexical entry.
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3.1.3.2 Enriched Composition
Unlike the GL approach, which is compatible with a theory that assumes derivations
proceed incrementally, Jackendoff’s (1997) Enriched Composition approach assumes deriva-
tions proceed in parallel, via independent rule systems at the various interfaces. On this
account, the lexicon is part of the interface between the syntactic and the conceptual (or
semantic) components of the grammar, and lexical items are themselves seen as the corre-
spondence rules (Jackendoff 1997:89). Thus in cases where an argument’s type matches the
selectional requirements of its functor, the elements can be brought together via normal
function application. However, when a mismatch occurs, as with cases of complement
coercion, an operator is inserted into the representation as an intervener, which assigns an
activity interpretation to the entity NP, allowing it to be interpreted as “an unspecified
activity involving NP” (Jackendoff 1997:61). As Culicover and Jackedoff (2005) put it,
“coercion is said to mediate between a function and an incompatible argument the way
an adapter mediates between and incompatible socket and plug” (as cited in Audring &
Booij (2016:627)). In cases of complement coercion, the type-mismatch occurring between
the eventive verb and its entity NP complement triggers a semantic process of enrichment
where the utterance is augmented by the function (informally) presented in (11).
(11) Interpret NP as [ActivityF(NP)]
The specific activity described by the sentence is initially left open, and determined (at a
second or later stage of interpretation) by semantic and pragmatic information associated
with the object NP, the verb’s subject, and possibly, discourse context. This approach is
intuitively appealing, as the unspecified nature of the activity contributed by application
of the enrichment function nicely reflects the absence of an overt activity expressed in
the surface syntax of coercion constructions. However, it is also somewhat difficult to
evaluate by virtue of the fact that the details of specification are left vague, making it
difficult to derive clear predictions about how language users actually compute coerced
interpretations.
While both type-shifting theories discussed in this section view semantic objects as
highly structured, they differ with regard to the type of information assumed to be incor-
porated into lexical representation, as well as in the mechanisms employed for generat-
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ing the meaning of a complex expression. On Pustejovsky’s Generative Lexicon approach,
for example, lexical representations contain only linguistic information, independent of
common-sense knowledge and pragmatic inferencing (Pustejovsky 1995:233). This in-
formation can then be accessed by semantic and syntactic mechanisms for generating
meaning. As such, the GL theory is an analytic one, purporting to distinguish analytic
and synthetic information at the level of linguistic representations. However, as noted in
the previous subsection, the theory has been criticized for the lack of success with which it
appears to be able to achieve this distinction.
On Jackendoff’s Enriched Composition approach, on the other hand, lexical represen-
tations include all the richness and interconnections of human knowledge (sometimes
called encyclopedic knowledge and sometimes pragmatic), which his coercion mechanism
can make use of during the construction of an interpretation (Jackendoff 1997:64). Thus,
our selection of one type-shifting approach over the other may boil down to theoretical
considerations about the structure of lexical entries.
An additional challenge faced by both type-shifting accounts of complement coercion
sketched in this section regards the fact that they rely on the assumption that verbs like
begin and enjoy require events as their internal arguments, and that NPs which are not
inherently eventive must be coerced, or type-shifted, in order to comply. However, as the
sentences in (12) illustrate, coercion verbs in combination with entity-denoting NPs do not
always give rise to an eventive interpretation.
(12) a. This is the famous perch that officially begins the Appalachian Trail.
b. A little porcelain pot finished the row.
c. A thunderstorm started the morning. (Pin˜ango & Deo 2016:569)
These examples, characterized in the literature as representing the so-called “constitutive”
reading of aspectual predicates, illustrate that verbs like begin and finish do not obligatorily
select for events (Lai et al. 2016, 2014; Pin˜ango & Deo 2016). In (12-a), for example, ‘begins
the Appalachian Trail’ does not mean that some activity associated with the Appalachian
Trail has been initiated, but simply that the ‘famous perch’ is situated at the beginning, or
entrance of the trail. Similarly, in (12-b), the subject ‘a little porcelain pot’ is understood
as being positioned at the end of a row; it does not assert the culmination of an activity
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or event associated with the row. Likewise, in (12-c), the aspectual verb started does not
express the initiation of an event related to the sentential complement, ‘the morning,’ but
rather is understood as situating it’s subject, ‘a thunderstorm,’ at the beginning of the
dimension (perhaps a temporal one in this case) along which ‘the morning’ is understand.
Thus, while it is clear that the complement coercion constructions considered above ex-
hibit the availability (and arguably the necessity) of an eventive interpretation, it is not
clear how the diagnostic of an entity-NP in combination with a coercion verb yielding an
eventive interpretation captures a semantically homogeneous class of predicates, given
that said predicates do not strictly select for events. Such observations have motivated
the development of an alternative view of complement coercion, as well as the lexical
semantics of the relevant verbs. This approach, known as the Structured Individuals
Hypothesis, is reviewed below.
3.1.4 The Structured Individuals Hypothesis
Based on the weaknesses facing type-shifting accounts of complement coercion, Pin˜ango
and Deo (2012, 2016) and Lai et al. (2014, 2016) argue for a unified analysis for aspectual
verbs, which distinguishes them from both the psychological verbs, as well as the “other”
identified coercion verbs—in effect proposing a redefinition of the set of “coercion” verbs
such that only aspectual verbs are included.
Recent proposals label the approach the ‘Structured Individuals Hypothesis’ (SIH) on
account of the fact that aspectual predicates are analyzed as selecting not for eventive
complements, but rather, for ‘structured individuals’ or incremental theme arguments—
i.e., entities which can be conceptualized as structures composed of parts ordered along
some salient axis or dimension (of which events are a type) (Lai et al. 2016). The hypoth-
esis suggests that the lexical entry for each aspectual verb encodes a set of functions for
mapping complement denotations to specific dimensions (e.g., f space, f time, f info), and
that all sentences involving aspectual predicates are semantically ambiguous regarding the
dimension along which the complement is to be interpreted.
On this account, the type of reading assigned to an expression containing an aspectual
predicate depends on two factors: whether the subject is animate or not, and the choice of
dimension along which incremental theme argument is to be interpreted (Lai et al. 2016:4).
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If the subject of an aspectual verb is inanimate, for example, the analysis predicts that
their composition will give rise to a constitutive reading. If the subject is animate, on the
other hand, a constitutive reading may still be available; however, in this case (and only in
this case), the hypothesis predicts an additional, “agentive” reading, understood along an
eventive dimension, to be available.
Thus this approach establishes the existence of a superset relation between constitutive
and agentive readings of aspectual verbs, such that agentive readings are predicted to
be available only in the event of an animate subject; however, constitutive readings are
predicted to be available regardless of the subject’s animacy (Lai et al. 2016:5).
Reconsidering the examples in (12) in light of this analysis seems to add credence to the
hypothesis: ‘the Appalachian Trail,’ for instance, in (12-a) denotes a structured individual
(namely, a path), which can be measured along a spatial dimension, and of which ‘begin’
picks out the initial subpart. Similarly, ‘the morning’ in (12-c) denotes an incremental theme
understood along a temporal dimension. In the case of complement coercion constructions
like ‘The woman began the book,’ which has an animate subject, an agentive reading is
available, in which the incremental theme object ‘the book’ is interpreted along an eventive
dimension. However, the prediction that the choice of subject (animate vs. inanimate) and
choice of dimension will alone determine whether an agentive reading is available is not
borne out in all cases, as illustrated by the sentence in example (13), which has an agentive
reading (understood along an eventive dimension) despite lacking an animate subject. The
authors do not note this exception.
(13) The printer started my paper. (Lai et al. 2016:5)
Moreover, if only aspectual verbs participate in complement coercion, there is no obvi-
ous explanation for the availability of an eventive interpretation in sentences where, for
example, a psychological verb takes an entity-denoting noun as its internal argument
and nevertheless yields an eventive interpretation, as with the sentence ‘Alice enjoyed her
morning coffee.’ Thus, while the structured individual hypothesis has clear advantages, it is
not obvious that this account is superior to a type-shifting approach in its ability to account
for the facts.
While both the SIH and type-shifting proposals characterize complement coercion sen-
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tences as being computationally more complex than non-coercive sentences, the SIH pre-
dicts the complexity to be present only in the case of aspectual verbs, regardless of whether
they engender the “constitutive reading,” and attribute the complexity to the process of
disambiguating the dimension along which the complement is to be understood. The
type-shifting accounts, on the other hand, attribute the complexity to the detection of a
type-mismatch and subsequent insertion/activation of a type-shifting, or coercion, opera-
tor, and predict its presence in coercive environments involving all of the verbs identified
in §3—that is, the aspectual, psychological, and “other” verbs.
In order to determine which (if either) of these predictions is borne out, let’s now turn
our attention to the empirical evidence put forth by psycholinguistic investigations into
the processing of complement coercion sentences.
3.2 Experimental literature
Several studies have found evidence suggesting that coercive sentences are harder to
process13 than non-coercive ones, in otherwise neutral contexts (Frisson & McElree 2008;
McElree et al. 2001; Pickering et al. 2005; Traxler et al. 2002b). Among the first to ex-
perimentally investigate the processing correlates of complement coercion were McElree,
Traxler, Pickering, Seely, and Jackendoff (2001), who tested 33 native English speakers
using a self-paced reading paradigm, comparing word-by-word reading times across the
three types of sentences presented in (14).
(14) a. The author was starting the book in his house on the island. (coercion)
b. The author was writing the book in his house on the island. (preferred)
c. The author was reading the book in his house on the island. (non-preferred)
The authors hypothesized that if selectional mismatches between a verb and its comple-
ment trigger semantic type-shifting or enrichment operations, then sentences with mis-
matching elements should engender longer reading times than sentences whose argu-
ments straightforwardly satisfy the selectional requirements of the verb (McElree et al.
2001:B21). The three conditions exemplified in (14) were chosen with the idea in mind
13The studies reviewed in this section operationalize processing difficulty as reliable differences in reading
times, where longer reading times are thought to reflect greater difficulty in computing the meaning of a given
expression (Lowder & Gordon 2016:923).
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that (14-b) & (14-c), where the verb/complement pairs straightforwardly compose, would
serve as controls, but chose preferred (14-b) and non-preferred (14-c) versions of the con-
trols in order to rule out the possibility of prototype effects influencing their results. They
reasoned that comprehenders may process prototypical or familiar verb/complement pairs
more readily than less prototypical pairs, but predicted that such an effect would be smaller
than if the verb/complement pair required a type-shifting operation to enable composi-
tion. ‘Preferred’ and ‘non-preferred’ sentences were derived using a cloze test, in which
over two hundred participants provided fill-in-the-blank responses to sentences like ‘The
author was starting the book’ where the most common responses were used for the
preferred condition, and the least common (though still plausible) responses were used
for the non-preferred condition (McElree et al. 2001:B20).
At the verb region, no significant differences in reading times emerged across the three
conditions; however, at the complement NP (the book) and NP+1 (in) regions, reading times
were significantly longer in the coercion condition. While reading times were slower in the
non-preferred condition than in the preferred condition at the complement NP, there were
no differences in reading times between the two control sentences beyond this region,
suggesting that the relative slow-down in the non-preferred condition was due to the non-
prototypical complement. The fact that the slow-down in reading times persisted into the
NP+1 region in the coercion condition was taken as evidence that interpreting coercive
sentences is computationally more costly than interpreting non-coercive ones due to the
need for a type-shifting repair mechanism during the process of composition (McElree
et al. 2001:B22).
Traxler, Pickering, and McElree (2002) followed up on this study with three experi-
ments using both self-paced reading and eye-tracking methodologies. Experiment 1 served
as a manipulation check, replicating the study done by McElree et al. (2001), using eye-
tracking rather than self-paced reading. Again it was found that sentences in the coercion
condition incurred longer reading times at the complement NP and NP+1 regions than
either control (Traxler et al. 2002b:535). Still, given the possibility that reading times were
longer in the coerced environment simply because readers have more difficulty in general
with assigning eventive interpretations, or alternatively, simply because verbs like begin
and start are semantically less specific than verbs like read, thus requiring more interpre-
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tive processing, the authors designed an additional experiment to test these hypotheses.
Experiment 2 investigated these possibilities by comparing reading measures at the verb,
complement NP, and NP+1 regions for sentences across the four conditions illustrated in
(15).
(15) a. The boy started the fight after school today. (event + event)
b. The boy saw the fight after school today. (neutral + event)
c. The boy started the puzzle after school today. (event + entity)
d. The boy saw the puzzle after school today. (neutral + entity)
(Traxler et al. 2002b:537)
If eventive-NPs were simply harder to process than non-eventive NPs, sentences such
as (15-a)—(15-b) were expected to be more difficult (i.e., read more slowly) than (15-c)—
(15-d). If, on the other hand, the verbs used in the previous coercion studies were simply
harder to process due to semantic properties, a main effect of verb type was expected to
emerge such that (15-a) & (15-c) were more difficult. Instead, what the authors found was
an interaction between verb-type and NP-type, such that reading times were longer for
sentences with event-selecting (or coercion) verbs and entity-denoting NPs (15-c) at the
NP and NP+1 regions, again suggesting that readers experience processing difficulty only
when the default interpretation of an NP is incompatible with the that of the selecting
verb (Traxler et al. 2002b:540). Experiment 3 replicated experiment 2 using self-paced
reading, and found results consistent with both experiments 1 and 2. The authors conclude
that these results “provide further evidence that self-paced reading and eye-movement
monitoring can lead to similar results for semantic processing” (Traxler et al. 2002b:542).
Pickering, McElree, and Traxler (2005) also adopt an eye-tracking procedure, this time
testing the addition of a full-VP preferred condition,14 as shown in (16-d).
(16) a. The carpenter began the table during the morning break. (coerced)
b. The carpenter built the table during the morning break. (preferred)
c. The carpenter sanded the table during the morning break. (non-preferred)
14Where preferred and non-preferred readings were again established using a cloze probability survey
(Pickering et al. 2005).
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d. The carpenter began building the table during the morning break. (full-VP
preferred)
Again, significantly longer reading times were found at the complement NP and NP+1
regions only in the coerced condition, indicating that the processing cost emerged from
mismatching type specifications between the verb and NP complement, since the same
coercion verbs did not yield a processing cost when combined with a verbal complement
(i.e., the full-VP preferred condition) (Pickering et al. 2005).
Still, the possibility remained that the processing cost previously associated with com-
plement coercion sentences could be due to the need for selecting a single interpretation
out of several competing interpretations (i.e., ambiguity resolution). To investigate this
possibility, Frisson and McElree (2008) tested 40 native English speakers, again using an
eye-tracking methodology, on sentences with weakly and strongly constrained interpreta-
tions (Frisson & McElree 2008). Examples of their stimuli are presented in (17).
(17) a. The teenager began the novel as soon as he got to his room upstairs.
(strongly preferred, coerced)
b. The teenager read the novel as soon as he got to his room upstairs.
(strongly preferred, control)
c. The waitress started the coffee as soon as she returned to the counter.
(weakly preferred, coerced)
d. The waitress served the coffee as soon as she returned to the counter.
(weakly preferred, control)
The authors reasoned that if the observed processing cost is in fact due to inherent
ambiguity in these sentences, then the magnitude of the processing cost should be greater
in sentences such as (17-c), which have several likely interpretations, than in sentences
such as (17-a), which have a single prominent interpretation.15 The authors found that,
15The strongly vs. weakly preferred interpretations were again determined using a cloze probability test
similar to that used in McElree et al. 2001; for the strongly preferred coercion condition, the dominant inter-
pretation was used an average of 90.4% of the time, where the ratio of most-frequent to second-most-frequent
response was 14:1, suggesting a single, strongly-preferred interpretation. For the weakly-preferred condition,
this ratio was 2:1, with the most frequent response being provided an average of 45.4% of the time (Frisson &
McElree 2008:5).
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contra the ambiguity resolution hypothesis, the magnitude of the coercion effect did not
differ depending on how strongly or weakly constrained the possible interpretations for a
coercive sentence were. These findings have been taken to suggest that it is the process of
constructing an eventive interpretation, and not the disambiguation of possible interpre-
tations, which causes the observed processing cost (Frisson & McElree 2008:7).
Similar findings have been demonstrated using other time-sensitive measures such as
ERP (Baggio et al. 2010; Kuperberg et al. 2010). While the details of these studies are not
particularly germane to the present discussion (and are thus not reviewed in detail), it
is worth noting that in these studies, the NP complements in coercion sentences evoked
a significantly larger N400 amplitudes than NP complements in the control conditions
(Baggio et al. 2010) and similar N400 amplitudes to that of NPs in highly-implausible
sentences with animacy violations (Kuperberg et al. 2010). While N400 measures have
been linked to both semantic integration as well as to lexical access (Kutas & Federmeier
2000; Lau et al. 2008), they have also been linked to a word’s surprisal factor, or expectancy
within a given context, such that the less expected a word is in some context, the larger the
N400 amplitude (Kutas & Hillyard 1984). In the complement coercion cases, the authors
of these studies have attributed the N400 effects to the detection of a mismatch in types
between the semantic properties of the complement NP and selectional restrictions of the
verb (Kuperberg et al. 2010).
Based on the empirical evidence covered thus far, the type-shifting approach to comple-
ment coercion appears to be most promising. Not only is there empirical evidence consis-
tent with the type-shifting hypothesis—that is, the fact that coercion effects emerge at just
the point in processing when the supposed type conflict is thought to be encountered—but
also, evidence put forth by Frisson and McElree (2008) from an experiment designed to di-
rectly test whether the observed coercion costs could be attributed to ambiguity resolution
indicates that ambiguity cannot be the culprit (Frisson & McElree 2008). Of course it is
possible that these findings only pertain to lexical ambiguity, while the difficulty observed
in complement coercion sentences is actually the result of a dimensional ambiguity as
suggested by the SIH. If so, the fact that processing difficulty is observed at the point
of encountering the critical NP and slightly after could just as reasonably be explained as
the process of selecting the correct dimension along which to interpret the verb’s internal
43
argument.
Still, evidence put forth by Traxler et al. (2002) also seems to favor a type-shifting
account over the SIH. The fact that no coercion cost was observed in sentences involving
coercion verbs with eventive NP complements goes against predictions of the SIH, which
expects a processing cost to emerge any time an aspectual verb is encountered, since
(by hypothesis) there will always be ambiguity regarding which dimensional function to
activate when composition with aspectual verbs occurs. Nevertheless, recent evidence
suggests that there may still be hope for the SIH.
While all of the studies discussed so far have treated the so-called “coercion verbs” as
a homogeneous set, Katsika et al. (2012) argue that these studies suffer from a serious con-
found arising from apparently unacknowledged “lexico-semantic differences” between
two classes of verbs used in their stimuli: aspectual and psychological verbs (Katsika et al.
2012:60). The authors present evidence from an eye-tracking study contrasting sentences
with aspectual, psychological, and control verbs (shown in (18)), which indicates that the
psychological verbs used in previous complement coercion studies behave as controls,
while only the aspectual verbs display the expected coercion cost.
(18) a. Alexandra was completing a sci-fi book when the secretary announced the
meeting. (aspectual)
b. Alexandra was enjoying a sci-fi book when the secretary announced the meet-
ing. (psychological)
c. Alexandra was shelving a sci-fi book when the secretary announced the meet-
ing. (control)
The authors note that while an eventive interpretation does seem to arise with all the
verbs used in the previous studies, “in the absence of more robust syntactic or semantic
shared properties, the hypothesis that eventive inferences must be attributed to the same
mechanism of building meaning (coercion + type shifting) is too strong” (Katsika et al.
2012:61). Instead, they argue that only aspectual verbs in these constructions involve
type-shifting, while the psychological verbs simply involve pragmatic inferencing—the
effects of which are predicted to emerge later than the effects of type-shifting since, on
their assumption, pragmatic inferencing takes effect at a later stage of processing (Katsika
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et al. 2012:58).
Lai et al. (2014) present similar findings from a self-paced reading study designed
instead to test the viability of the dimensional ambiguity hypothesis. In their study, partici-
pants were presented with sentences from three conditions (aspectual verbs, psychological
verbs, and control verbs) as exemplified in (19).
(19) [Lady Gaga]1 [started(AspectualV) / preferred(EnjoyingV) /loved(LovingV)]2 [this CD]3
[of]4 [American]5 [pop hits.]6
(Lai et al. 2014:4)
They hypothesized that only sentences in the aspectual verb condition would engender
a processing cost, while sentences in the enjoy-type psychological verb condition and love-
type psychological verb condition (which served as their control condition) would not,
since according to the SIH, only aspectual verbs involve necessary ambiguity resolution
(Lai et al. 2014:4). Their findings replicated those of Katsika et al. (2012) in showing
evidence of a processing cost at the NP+1 and NP+2 regions (their regions 4 and 5 as
reflected in (19)) only in the aspectual verb condition. Again, results from the enjoy-type
verb condition did not differ from the control condition on any of the relevant measures.
However, while this evidence is compelling, it may not be as conclusive as it appears.
In Katsika et al. (2012), for example, many of the verbs used in the control condition were
very low-frequency (e.g., unearth, peruse, subscribe to, conduct, submit, shelve) compared
with the verbs in the test conditions, which could have had an influence on the speed
with which these sentences were processed by participants. Moreover, at their critical
region (which included both the verb and complement), one reading measure revealed a
significant effect in only the aspectual verb condition, while a different measure for the
same region revealed a significant effect in only the control condition. Similarly, in their
continuation region (comparable to the NP+1 regions of the other studies), one reading
measure revealed a main effect of verb in the aspectual condition, while another measure
indicated that aspectual verbs were significantly different from the controls, while the
psychological verbs did not statistically differ from either the aspectual verb or control
conditions (Katsika et al. 2012:66).
Similarly, in Lai et al. (2014), while the aim was again to test differences in the pro-
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cessing profiles of verbs from different semantic classes, the verbs comprising their control
condition, like those in their enjoy-typeV test condition, were from the semantic class of
subject-experiencer psychological verbs (Landau 2009:6). This confounds their results
since the love-type verbs cannot serve as a true control for testing differences between
semantic classes of verbs if they are from the same semantic class as the test groups.
Moreover, in their example stimuli presented in (19), the aspectual verb permits both a
coerced reading with an eventive interpretation, as well as a constitutive reading with a
metonymic subject16 (that is, the sentence could be taken to express that the first song on
the CD in question happened to be a Lady Gaga song), thus, if (19) is representative of their
stimuli on the whole in this regard, the differences in reading measures observed in this
study could be confounded by ambiguity between an eventive and constitutive reading
of the aspectual verbs. Thus, while the evidence presented in these two studies seems
to suggest that the psychological verbs previously used in investigations of complement
coercion do not actually incur a processing cost, the book has not been closed on the matter.
In recent investigations concerning the interaction of semantic and syntactic complex-
ity, Lowder and Gordon (2015, 2016) present evidence that the coercion cost associated
with processing complement coercion sentences is significantly reduced when the critical
constituents—the entity-NP and event-selecting verb—are separated by a clause bound-
ary. Lowder and Gordon (2015), for example, conducted two eye-tracking studies where
they tested whether putting the coercing verb and entity-NP complement in different
clauses of the same sentence would have an effect of the magnitude of the coercion cost.
In Experiment 1, they presented speakers with coercive and non-coercive sentences in the
passive form, with and without relative clauses, as shown in (20).
(20) a. [The memo was begun by the secretary this morning. . . ] (Simple, Coercion)
b. [The memo [that was begun/written by the secretary this morning. . . ]] (RC,
Coercion)
c. [The memo was written by the secretary this morning. . . ]] (Simple Control)
16Unlike in the cases of Lai et al. (2014) and Katsika et al. (2012), the stimuli used in previous studies
on complement coercion have consistently been published in their entirety, and do not suffer from this
potential point of ambiguity; sentences used in coercion conditions have consistently permitted only a coerced
interpretation.
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d. [The memo [that was written by the secretary this morning. . . ]] (RC, Control)
In Experiment 2, they replicated the design of Experiment 1, only this time using clefts and
pseudoclefts, as shown in (21).
(21) a. [It was the secretary that began/wrote the memo. . . ] (Cleft, Coercive)
b. [It was the secretary that began/wrote the memo. . . ] (Cleft, Control)
c. [What the secretary began/wrote [was the memo. . . ]] (Pseudocleft, Coercive)
d. [What the secretary began/wrote [was the memo. . . ]] (Pseudocleft, Control)
By introducing the relative clause and pseudocleft constructions, the authors were able
to create a clause boundary between the coercing verb (begin) and it’s entity complement
(the memo), as indicated by the brackets in (20) and (21). In both experiments, they found
that the magnitude of the coercion cost was significantly reduced when the critical con-
stituents were separated by a clause boundary (Lowder & Gordon 2015). In the simple
sentences and cleft sentences, there was a significant slow-down in reading measures at
the critical NP and NP+1 regions as compared to controls, reflecting the previous findings
on complement coercion. However, this effect was mitigated by the introduction of a
clause boundary, such that in the pseudocleft and relative clause conditions, no statistically
significant effects emerged at any of the relevant regions; coercive sentences where the
critical constituents appeared in separate clauses looked statistically identical to control
sentences without coercing elements.
In addition to providing contexts for the introduction of a clause boundary, the use of
passive and cleft constructions in these experiments allowed the researchers to investigate
whether the mitigating effect of the clause boundary would appear regardless of the degree
of focus placed on the critical NP. That is, in the pseudocleft environment, the NP is in a
focalized position, while in the passive RC condition, it is in a subordinate clause, consid-
ered a deemphasized position (Baker & Wagner 1987). The fact that the mitigating effect
emerged regardless of the structural importance of the complement NP is taken by the
authors as a strong indication of how structure can importantly influence the relationship
between elements in a sentences (Lowder & Gordon 2015:534).
In 2016, Lowder and Gordon again investigated this mitigating effect of sentence struc-
ture on complement coercion using eye-tracking methodology. In Experiment 1, the au-
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thors investigated whether simply embedding the coercive elements together within a
relative clause was sufficient for reducing the processing cost associated with complement
coercion (Lowder & Gordon 2016). The reasoning behind this design was motivated by
evidence put forth by Baker and Wagner (1987), who found that participants were poorer
at detecting false or contradictory information when it was contained within a subordi-
nate clause than when it was presented in the main clause, suggesting that information
contained in structurally subordinate positions may simply be processed at a shallower
level than information contained in the main clause. Thus, it could be the case that the
mitigating effect observed in Lowder and Gordon (2015) was simply due to logical sub-
ordination of information, rather than structural deemphasis of the relationship between
the relevant constituents. To test this possibility, the authors compared reading times for
coercive and non-coercive subject relative clause (SRC) constructions, which place both the
critical verb and NP complement together within the embedded clause (again, thought to
be a structurally defocalized position (Baker & Wagner 1987)), and simple sentences, which
present the critical constituents together in the main clause. An example of their stimuli is
shown in (22).
(22) a. [The secretary began the memo about the new office policy. . . ] (Simple, Coer-
cion)
b. [The secretary wrote the memo about the new office policy. . . ] (Simple, Con-
trol)
c. [The secretary [that began the memo about the new office policy. . . ]] (SRC,
Coercion)
d. [The secretary [that wrote the memo about the new office policy. . . ]] (SRC,
Control)
While there was a significant effect of coercion such that the coercion conditions elicited
longer reading measures at the NP and NP+1 regions than the controls, no significant
differences in the magnitude of the coercion effect were observed across the two clause
types, suggesting that structural deemphasis of the constituents via clausal subordination
in the SRCs did not cause the relationship between them to be processed at a more shallow
level (Lowder & Gordon 2016:925).
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This study was followed up by Experiment 2 where the authors again tested the hy-
pothesis that separating the critical constituents with a clause boundary would mitigate
the effects of complement coercion. In this experiment, they used the same SRCs from
experiment 1, but instead of contrasting these with simple sentences, they used object-
relative clause (ORC) constructions, which place the complement in the main clause and
the coercing verb in the embedded clause, as shown in (23).
(23) a. [The memo [that the secretary began] announced that. . . ]] (ORC, Coercion)
b. [The memo [that the secretary wrote] announced that. . . ]] (ORC, Control)
c. [The secretary [that began the memo about the new office policy. . . ]] (SRC,
Coercion)
d. [The secretary [that wrote the memo about the new office policy. . . ]] (SRC,
Control)
SRCs and ORCs provide a particularly interesting testing ground for this hypothesis since
it is well established in the literature that ORCs are more difficult to process (i.e. engender
longer reading times) than their SRC counterparts (Gordon et al. 2001; Staub 2010; Traxler
et al. 2002a). However, contra the standard ORC-SRC asymmetry, the authors found
no significant differences between SRCs and ORCs in the coercion condition across any
reading measures (Lowder & Gordon 2016:932). This was not the case for their control
condition, which exhibited the standard asymmetry, with ORCs being significantly more
difficult than SRCs. Based on these findings, the authors speculated that the structural sep-
aration of the coercive elements in the ORCs mitigated the coercion effect; however, since
there was no structural separation between coercive elements in the SRC environment, the
coercion effect fully emerged, making them just as difficult to process as the ORCs (Lowder
& Gordon 2016:934).
The stimuli used by Lowder and Gordon was adapted from earlier studies on comple-
ment coercion discussed above, and though they acknowledge the findings of Katsika et
al. (2012), their stimuli nevertheless treat the aspectual and psychological verbs identified
in the literature on complement coercion and used in previous experiments as a homo-
geneous set. As the authors themselves note, “it is unclear whether and to what extent
the modulating effects of sentence structure observed in [(Lowder & Gordon 2016)] and in
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[(Lowder & Gordon 2015)] depend on verb subclass difference; this remains an important
area for future research” (Lowder & Gordon 2016:931).
Indeed, given that coercion effects were observed even when the psychological verbs
in question made up a significant proportion of experimental stimuli (even constituting
the majority of experimental stimuli in some cases, e.g., Frisson and McElree, 2008), fur-
ther research is necessary before it can be determined whether both psychological and
aspectual verbs in complement coercion contexts engender a processing cost, and whether
the modulating effects of sentence structure are in fact due to semantic features associated
with only a subset of the coercion verbs. In the next section, I will describe the details of
an experiment designed to test this possibility.
CHAPTER 4
THE EXPERIMENT
Following the design of Lowder and Gordon (2016), the present study aims to fill this
gap in our understanding of complement coercion phenomena by investigating whether
both classes of coercion verbs (aspectual and psychological) discussed in the literature,
and used in previous studies, display similar modulating effects in ORCs as compared
to SRCs. While replicating the design of earlier studies which utilize simple-sentence
constructions may speak to potential differences between the verb classes with respect
to complement coercion, the use of more complex sentence structures, such as ORCs and
SRCs, additionally allows for the investigation of whether their semantic differences are
relevant for the modulation of coercion effects in different sentential contexts, which could
potentially tell us even more about how the relationship between coercive constituents is
computed.
4.1 Method
To investigate the potential differences between the two classes of verbs with respect
to both the presence and mitigation of a coercion effect, I adopt a self-paced reading,
moving-window paradigm, implemented on a PC using Linger software (a psycholin-
guistic experimentation framework written by Doug Rohde of Tedlab, 2001) and equipped
with a mechanical gaming keyboard with a sampling rate of 1000hz.
4.1.1 Hypotheses
Following McElree et al. (2001), Traxler et al. (2002; 2005), who have observed reliable
effects at the complement NP and NP+1 regions, the primary regions of interest for the
present study are: the initial coercion cue (the complement NP in SRCs and the embedded
verb in ORCs) and the matrix verb (i.e., the NP+1 region). If the psychological verbs
used in previous coercion studies indeed behave like controls, as predicted by Katsika
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et al. (2012) and Lai et al. (2014), we should expect an interaction between verb-type and
structure-type such that ORCs are harder to process at the relevant regions than SRCs only
in the psychological-verb condition (thus reflecting the standard ORC/SRC asymmetry),
while in the aspectual-verb condition, ORCs and SRCs should not differ in reading times
for the relevant regions (consistent with the findings of Lowder and Gordon, 2016).
Alternatively, if the psychological verbs used in previous coercion studies behave as
the other coercion verbs, no significant differences are expected to emerge at either of
the regions of interest across the two experimental conditions; and importantly, for both
aspectual and psychological verb conditions, reading times for SRCs should be identical
to that of ORCs, contra the standard ORC-SRC asymmetry.
4.1.2 Participants
Forty native English speaking speakers, recruited from the University of Utah under-
graduate research pool, participated in this study in exchange for course credit.
4.1.3 Stimuli
Experimental items consisted of 18 experimental quartets following the example pre-
sented in (1) where the complement NP was positioned as the subject of the main clause
and extracted object of the RC containing the coercing verb in ORCs ((1-a) and (1-c)), or
where both the NP complement and coercing verb were positioned together within the em-
bedded clause of the SRCs ((1-b) and (1-d)) (see Appendix for the full list of experimental
items).
(1) a. The memo that the secretary began announced that there would be pay raises
for all the employees. (Aspectual-ORC)
b. The secretary that began the memo announced that there would be pay raises
for all the employees. (Aspectual-SRC)
c. The textbook that the student endured provided valuable insight into fixing the
computer problems. (Psychological-ORC)
d. The student that endured the textbook provided valuable insight into fixing the
computer problems. (Psychological-SRC)
Because the experimental stimuli used in Lowder and Gordon (2016) did not contain an
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equal number of instances for each of the verb classes of interest, stimuli from Frisson and
McElree (2008) and Traxler and Pickering et al. (2002) were also included. In these cases,
the sentences were adapted to fit the SRC structures by inserting the complementizer ‘that’
after the subject NP. Sentences for the ORC condition were then generated by positioning
the target NP of the SRC as the sentence subject and embedding the agent inside the RC
along with the verb. The remainder of the sentences were re-written to include a matrix
verb and post-verb material that could be attributed to the head NP of either the SRC or
the ORC constructions.
Test items were divided across two lists so that each participant saw one ORC and one
SRC from each experimental quartet without repetition of the verb (e.g., (1-a) and (1-d), or
(1-b) and (1-c)) and so that there was an equal number of sentences from each condition
across the two lists. Each list was also presented in its reverse order, and the resulting four
lists were randomly assigned to participants, with 10 participants completing each list;
thus obtaining 36 data points per subject. The experimental stimuli were combined with
90 filler sentences of various types yielding a total of 126 sentences, and item presentation
followed a random order, with test items being separated by at least one filler sentence.
4.1.3.1 Stimuli norming
4.1.3.1.1 Word-length. To ensure that any differences observed between the two verb
groups were not due to differences in the lengths of the words at the critical regions, stimuli
were balanced for word length. One-way between-subject ANOVAs with verb-type as the
independent variable (two levels: Aspectual and Psychological) and character-count (for
the embedded verbs, matrix verbs, and complement NPs) as the dependent measure were
conducted. Character-counts for the aspectual-verbs condition in the embedded verbs
(M=7.89, SD=.212); matrix verbs (M=6.78, SD=1.987); and target NPs (M=6.11, SD=2.111)
did not differ from those in the psychological-verbs condition in the embedded verbs
(M=7.67, SD=.343), F(1,34)=.304, p=.585; matrix verbs (M=7.33, SD=1.940), F(1,34)=.720,
p=.402; or target NPs (M=6.17, SD=1.689), F(1,34)=.008, p=.931.
4.1.3.1.2 Plausibility. To ensure that any differences observed between the two verb
types are not due to differences in the plausibility of the sentences, stimuli were normed
for plausibility using an on-line survey hosted through Qualtrics (Snow & Mann 2013).
53
The 72 experimental sentences were divided across two lists, and combined with 40 filler
sentences following the plausibility procedure used in Frisson and McElree (2008). Filler
items included many implausible sentences to encourage participants to take advantage
of the full range of the rating scale. Participants were instructed to read each sentence at a
comfortable pace and to indicate how plausible each sentence was on a scale of 1 (totally
implausible/makes no sense) to 7 (perfectly plausible/makes total sense). The two lists
were presented in random order and complete by 36 and 49 participants, respectively. The
data were submitted to a one-way within-subjects ANOVA with verb-type as the inde-
pendent variable (two levels: Aspectual-verbs and Psychological-verbs) and plausibility
ratings as the dependent measure. Plausibility ratings for the Aspectual verb condition
(M=5.69, SD=.906) did not differ from that of the psychological verb condition (M=5.58,
SD=.932), F(1,84)=2.781, p=.099.
4.1.3.1.3 Frequency. The verbs used in the present study were also compared for fre-
quency using the SUBTLEX-US corpus, a web-based corpus containing over 51 million
words sampled from American English subtitles (Brysbaert & New 2009). Log frequencies
for the Aspectual verbs (M=3.646, SD=.353) were compared to that of the Psychological
verbs (M=2.915, SD=.514) using a one-way between-subjects ANOVA with verb-type as
the independent variable (two levels: Aspectual and Psychological) and log frequency as
the dependent measure.1 Results indicate that verbs in the Aspectual-verbs condition were
significantly more frequent than verbs in the Psychological-verbs condition F(1,8)=6.870,
p=.031. While this difference could have an influence on reading times, the prediction
would be that the higher frequency of Aspectual verbs could lead to faster reading times
at the verb region in the Aspectual-verbs condition relative to the Psychological-verbs
condition, thus any differences observed between the two verb classes of verbs that are
compatible with the hypothesis that psychological verbs behave as controls would be
strengthened by this fact. The flip side of this, of course, is that the differences in fre-
quency between the verb classes could constitute a limitation for interpreting results that
suggest no difference between the them. In such a case, it is possible that any observed
1Log frequencies, rather than raw frequencies (Aspectual verbs: M=6430.8, SD=6179.48; Psychological
verbs: M=1088.4,SD=986.06), on the basis of non-linear transformations being recommended to satisfy as-
sumptions of normality; i.e., to prevent extreme outliers in the data from obscuring trends characteristic of the
data-set on the whole (Lo & Andrews 2015).
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slow-down in reading times for the Psychological-verbs condition could be attributable to
their relatively low frequencies; however, in such a case, effects are not expected to persist
beyond the point at which the relevant verb is encountered (McElree et al. 2001).
4.1.4 Procedure
After providing consent, participants were seated in front of a computer monitor in a
quiet room and instructed to read at a normal, comfortable pace that would enable them
to answer comprehension questions. Sentences were presented with a self-paced moving
window procedure using a PC with a mechanical gaming keyboard with a sampling rate
of 1000hz and Linger experimental software (Rohde 2005). Each trial began with a fix-
ation cross presented in the center of the screen. With the first press of the space-bar, a
sentence, masked by dashes replacing the letters in each word, appeared. The next press
of the space-bar revealed the first word in the sentence, and with each subsequent press
of the space-bar, the next word was revealed while the previous word was re-masked.
After the final word in the sentence was revealed, the next space-bar press revealed a
true-false comprehension question which did not probe readers’ interpretations of the co-
erced expressions (Lowder & Gordon 2016). Participants responded to the comprehension
questions by pressing either ‘F’ for ‘YES’ or ‘J’ for ‘NO,’ and feedback was provided only
for wrong answer responses in order to encourage participants to pay attention.
The computer recorded the time intervals from the point at which a first word was
displayed until the subsequent press of the space bar. Each participant began the task with
a 4-filler sentence warm-up block before moving on to the remaining 122 sentences.
4.2 Results
Reading times longer than 2000ms2 (0.25% of the data) were excluded from the analy-
sis. All participants included in the analysis scored at least 90% correct on comprehension
questions. This criterion excluded data from one participant (2% of the data) who received
only 80% accuracy on comprehension questions. Mean self-paced reading times are pre-
sented by region and condition in Table 4.1. On the basis of previous findings (Lowder &
Gordon 2016; McElree et al. 2001; Traxler et al. 2002b), data analysis focused on two critical
2Following Traxler et al. (2002) who also use self-paced reading methodology (Traxler et al. 2002b:541).
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Table 4.1. Mean reading times
Asp-SRC The secretary that began the memo announced that...
Asp-ORC The memo that the secretary began announced that...
Psych-SRC The student that endured the textbook provided valuable...
















Asp-SRC - 414.48 419.56 459.74 429.76
Asp-ORC 426.64 - 422.46 471.10 447.71
Psych-SRC - 418.83 422.65 466.70 439.70
Psych-ORC 403.15 - 455.24 492.20 442.90
Notes: NP = noun phrase, SRC = subject relative clause, ORC = object relative clause.
The initial coercion cue described in the text corresponds to the target NP in SRCs, and
the embedded verb in ORCs.
regions: the initial coercion cue (the embedded verb in ORCs vs. the complement NP in
SRCs) and the matrix verb.
4.2.1 Comprehension-question accuracy
Mean comprehension question accuracy for each of the four experimental conditions
is as follows: Aspectual-ORC (96%), Aspectual-SRC (96%), Psychological-ORC (97%), and
Psychological-SRC (98%). There were no significant differences between the conditions.
4.2.2 Initial coercion cue
Reading time data from the initial coercion cue region were submitted to a two-way
repeated measures ANOVA with verb-type (two levels: Aspectual and Psychological) and
structure-type (two levels: SRC and ORC) as the independent variables, and reading times
at the initial coercion cue region as the dependent measure. Reading times for Aspectual
verbs in the SRC condition (M=419.56, SD=185.56) and in the ORC condition (M=422.46,
SD=162.91) did not differ from that of Psychological verbs in the SRC condition (M=422.65,
SD=157.46) or in the ORC condition (M=455.24, SD=200.12). There was no main effect of
verb, F(1,39)=2.65, p=.111; no main effect of structure type, F(1,39)=2.270, p=.140; and no
significant interaction, F(1,39)=1.689, p=.201. This is illustrated in the graph in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1. Mean reading times (in milliseconds) for the initial coercion cue region
4.2.3 Matrix verb
Reading time data from the matrix verb region were submitted to a two-way repeated
measures ANOVA with verb-type (two levels: Aspectual and Psychological) and structure-
type (two levels: SRC and ORC) as the independent variables, and reading times at the ma-
trix verb region as the dependent measure. Reading times for Aspectual verbs in the SRC
condition (M=459.74, SD=194.59) and in the ORC condition (M=471.09, SD=211.15) did not
differ from that of Psychological verbs in the SRC condition (M=466.70, SD=191.71) or in
the ORC condition (M=492.18, SD=172.94). There was no main effect of verb, F(1,39)=1.397,
p=.244; no main effect of structure type, F(1,39)=1.555, p=.220; and no significant interac-
tion, F(1,39)=.269, p=.607. This is illustrated in the graph in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2. Mean reading times (in milliseconds) for matrix verb region
Given that no effects emerged at the critical regions, data from the Matrix Verb + 1
region, the Embedded Verb, and the Target NP (as shown in Table 4.1), as well as the
Matrix Verb + 2 region, were also analyzed using two-way repeated measures ANOVAs
with verb-type (two levels: Aspectual and Psychological) and structure-type (two levels:
SRC and ORC) as the independent variables, and reading times at the relevant region as
the dependent measure.
4.2.4 Carry-Over Region
To examine potential differences in carry-over effects from previous regions, reading
time measures from the Matrix Verb + 1 and Matrix Verb + 2 regions were also analyzed.
Results from the Matrix Verb + 1 region revealed no ME of verb (F(1,39)=.210, p=.649),
no ME of structure-type (F(1,39)=.957, p=.334), and no significant interaction (F(1,39)=.948,
p=.336) between conditions for the Aspectual-SRC (M=429.13, SD=126.91), Aspectual-ORC
(M=447.14, SD=115.40), Psychological-SRC (M=441.96, SD= 130.24), and Psychological-
ORC (M=443.67, SD=113.95) conditions. Reading time measures from the Matrix Verb
+ 2 region also revealed no ME of verb (F(1,39)=2.252, p=.141), no ME of structure-type
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(F(1,39)=1.498, p=.228), and no significant interaction (F(1,39)=.939, p=.338) across any of
the four experimental conditions: Aspectual-SRC (M=401.10, SD= 112.83), Aspectual-ORC
(M=421.09, SD=121.28), Psychological-SRC (M=396.76, SD=95.99), and Psychological-ORC
(M=399.72, SD=99.27).
4.2.5 Target NP
Reading time measures from the Target NPs were also analyzed. Again, no statistically
significant differences were observed between the Aspectual-SRC (M=419.56, SD=185.56),
Aspectual-ORC (M=426.47, SD=163.52), Psychological-SRC (M=422.64, SD= 157.46), and
Psychological -ORC (M=403.15, SD=141.32) conditions. There was no ME of verb-type
(F(1,39)=.745, p=.393) and no ME of structure-type (F(1,39)=.760, p=.389). There was a
marginal trend toward an interaction between verb-type and structure-type observed in
this region (F(1,39)=3.595, p=.065), such that target NPs in the Psychological-ORC condi-
tion were read more quickly than in any of the other 3 conditions; however, this effect did
not reach significance. Nevertheless, the trend is interesting as it shows a pattern opposite
of that shown by the standard ORC-SRC asymmetry. This effect may have been driven
by enhanced difficulty in the processing of SRCs where the target NP appears within the
same clause as the selecting coercion verb.
4.2.6 Embedded Verb
Data from the Embedded Verbs were also submitted for analysis. Again, no statisti-
cally significant difference were found between the Aspectual-SRC (M=414.48, SD=122.80),
Aspectual-ORC (M=422.46, SD=162.91), Psychological-SRC (M=418.83, SD= 141.18), and
Psychological -ORC (M=455.24, SD=200.12) conditions. There was no ME of structure-
type (F(1,39)= 2.339, p=.134), and no interaction between verb-type and structure-type
(F(1,39)=2.116, p=.154) observed for this region; however, a marginal trend toward a ME
of verb-type did emerge (F(1,39)= 3.496, p=.069), again not reaching significance.3 This
effect could have been driven by differences in the relative frequency of verbs across the
3Data from all regions discussed in this section were also analyzed with the data points corresponding to
incorrect comprehension-question responses being removed (3.75% of the data). Again, no significant effects
emerged at any of the relevant regions except in the Embedded Verb region where the trend toward a ME of
verb strengthened (F(1,39)=3.857, p=.057), such that embedded verbs in the Aspectual-verb condition were
read faster than those in the Psychological-verb condition, regardless of structure-type.
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two verb classes, as mentioned in §4.1.3.1; however, such effects are not likely to persist,
and thus do not explain the lack of ORC/SRC asymmetry observed at later regions (Matrix
Verb, Matrix Verb +1, +2) (McElree et al. 2001; Traxler et al. 2002b).
4.3 Discussion
The results obtained in the present study are consistent with the findings of Low-
der and Gordon (2015, 2016) in demonstrating that the magnitude of the coercion cost
is reduced when the verb and complement NP appear in different clauses, as compared
to when they are presented together within the same clause (Lowder & Gordon 2015,
2016). Contra the well-attested ORC/SRC asymmetry, evidence of difficulty emerged in
the SRC condition where critical constituents appeared together within the same clause,
relative to the ORC condition where the target NP appeared outside the embedded clause
containing the coercing verb. The relative difficulty consistently associated with ORCs
at the relative-clause and matrix verb regions was eliminated completely in the coercion
environment, suggesting that indeed something about the within-clause composition of
the coercion verbs and entity-denoting complements contributed to the increased difficulty
observed in the SRC condition. The clausal separation offered by ORC constructions,
on the other hand, appears to have modulated this effect. The findings that SRCs were
just as difficult to process as ORCs at the initial coercion cue, matrix verb, and carry-over
regions, regardless of which semantic class the coercing verb belonged to (Psychological
or Aspectual), are consistent with previous experimental findings on complement coercion
which indicate that (within-clause) coercive verb-complement relations are more difficult
to process.
The experiment reported in this chapter also demonstrated that the modulating effect
of clausal separation in complement coercion sentences held for both the Psychological
and Aspectual verbs in the coercion verbs set. The fact that no differences were observed
between the two verb groups at the critical regions suggests that the Psychological verbs
used here and in previous studies do in fact demonstrate evidence of complement coercion.
Like the aspectual-verb condition, the psychological-verb condition showed evidence of
increased processing difficulty for SRCs at the critical regions, contra the standard ORC-
SRC pattern.
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The fact that uniform behavior was observed for the two verb groups investigated in
this experiment adds support to the proclivity to treat the coercion verbs as a homogeneous
set. However, it is of course still possible that these similar reading time measures for
the two verb groups actually reflect different compositional processes. For one, given the
difference in frequency observed for the two verb groups, noted in (1), the conclusiveness
of these findings is limited by the possibility that the effects observed here—that is, the
relative slow-down in SRCs as compared to control measures—are partially attributable to
the fact that the verbs in the Psychological-verb condition had a relatively low frequency
which caused a slow-down, while in the Aspectual-verb condition, what we are seeing is
an actual coercion effect, or alternatively, the effect of dimension ambiguity resolution, as
predicted by the SIH. Still, given that no slow-down occurred in the processing of ORCs
in the Psychological-verb condition (as with the Aspectual-verb condition), it is less likely
that the effects observed here were due to frequency effects.
Nevertheless, as an area for future research, the present study should be expanded
to additionally compare reading times for these verb groups and structures, featuring
eventive complements as well as entity-denoting complements. Recall that previous ex-
perimental findings suggest no evidence of a coercion cost when coercion verbs are com-
bined with either verbal complements or event-denoting NP complements (Pickering et al.
2005; Traxler et al. 2002b). As such, expanding the present study to incorporate eventive
complements, which are not predicted to engender a coercion cost, would allow for fur-
ther exploration into potential differences between Psychological and Aspectual verbs in
complement coercion contexts.
Likewise, while incorporating the use of SRC and ORCs into the design of the present
experiment provided an avenue for investigating the interaction of syntactic and semantic
complexity for both verb groups—an important area for research insofar as investigations
into the strength of compositionality are concerned—there nevertheless remains a need for
investigating potential differences in the behavior of these coercion verbs within simple




The empirical findings and theoretical considerations presented here tentatively appear
to favor a type-shifting account over the Structured Individual Hypothesis (SIH) in ac-
counting for complement coercion phenomena. Reading time studies on complement coer-
cion have consistently indicated that coercive sentences are costly to process. The fact that
the processing cost emerges at, and just after, the critical NP is encountered is consistent
with a type-shifting hypothesis, which predicts the detection of a type-mismatch, and sub-
sequent type-shifting or enrichment operation, to occur at about this point in processing.
Likewise, the neurolinguistic evidence discussed in §3.2 which found N400 amplitudes
similar to those for animacy-violating and highly-implausible sentences is also compatible
with a type-shifting hypothesis that relies on the detection of a selectional-violation.
On the other hand, the findings of Katsika et al. (2012) and Lai et al. (2014), which
suggest that Psychological verbs previously used in complement coercion studies actually
behave as controls, seem to offer support for the SIH, which treats aspectual verbs uni-
formly and excludes Psychological verbs from the so-called “coercion verbs” set, accredit-
ing dimensional ambiguity for the processing cost. While this approach has the advantage
of acknowledging the fact that Aspectual verbs select for scalar complements which are not
necessarily eventive, assuming the computational cost observed is the result of ambiguity
resolution does not explain the necessity of an eventive interpretation in complement
coercion sentences, especially when they feature a psychological predicate. Likewise,
reducing complement coercion to ambiguity resolution does not provide an explanation
for the findings of Traxler et al. (2002) and Pickering et al. (2005), who show evidence that
coercion verbs do not engender processing difficulty when combined with an eventive-NP
complement (Traxler et al. 2002b) or with a verbal complement (Pickering et al. 2005)—
evidence which the type-shifting hypothesis straightforwardly accounts for. Moreover,
the findings of Frisson and McElree (2008) directly challenge theories that attribute the
coercion cost to competition among possible interpretations, or to the need to select a
single appropriate interpretation out of many, since no differences in the magnitude of the
coercion cost were observed for strongly vs. weakly constrained interpretations (Frisson
& McElree 2008).
The argument is not that ambiguity plays no role in the processing of complement
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coercion constructions, but rather that previous experimental evidence on the processing
of ambiguity, along with the findings of the present study, make it unlikely that this is
all that happening. Indeed, investigations into the processing of lexical ambiguity have
consistently shown that while lexical ambiguity can increase difficulty in processing, the
effect only emerges when there is little difference in the frequency or meaning of an am-
biguous term. For example, Reyner and Duffy (1986) used a self-paced reading paradigm
to investigate the processing correlates of lexical ambiguity, finding that fixation times
were longer only when the ambiguous words had two equally likely interpretations, but
not when the ambiguous word had one highly likely meaning (either due to frequency
or contextual constraints) (Rayner & Duffy 1986). Mason and Just (2007), using an ERP
paradigm, similarly found evidence that different cortical regions were activated based on
whether the ambiguous words had ‘balanced’ (two equally likely readings) versus ‘biased’
(one likely reading) interpretations (Mason & Just 2007). Thus, given the evidence put forth
by Frisson and McElree (2008) that the magnitude of the coercion cost is not affected by
competition among possible interpretations, it seems the processing cost associated with
complement coercion cannot be reduced to ambiguity (Frisson & McElree 2008).
The findings of the present study are also at odds with the SIH since they clearly
show that the Psychological verbs did not differ from the Aspectual verbs in engendering
a processing cost at the critical regions. Conversely, the present results add support to
type-shifting accounts, since on these accounts, both coercive Psychological and Aspectual
verbs are treated as a homogeneous set with respect to the processing of complement
coercion. This type of theory predicts a compositional operation of enrichment (Jackendoff
1997), or type-shifting (Pustejovsky 1991), which enables comprehenders to construe an
eventive interpretation for the predicate-argument pair, taking place where, or shortly
after, the coerced element has been encountered.
One question is why this effect should be dampened in certain syntactic environments.
The explanation put forth by Lowder and Gordon (2016) suggests that while structural
deemphasis itself does not seem to affect the magnitude of the coercion cost, structural
separation of the critical constituents may have the effect of deemphasizing the relation-
ship between them (Lowder & Gordon 2016). In the case of ORCs such as ‘The memo that
the secretary began announced. . . ,’ for example, the target NP, ‘the memo,’ holds two rela-
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tionships: one to the embedded verb ‘began,’ and one to the matrix verb ‘announced,’ thus
it is possible that comprehenders, or the language-comprehension system, due to finite
resources, are prioritizing the main-clause relationship (where coercion does not apply),
over the cross-clausal relationship (which may remain underspecified), while in the case of
SRCs where the target NP enjoys only its relationship with the coercing verb, the coercion
effect emerges (Lowder & Gordon 2015:535). In other words, perhaps the information
contained within the embedded clause was being treated on a par with presupposition or
background information to that expressed in the main clause, such that the relationship
between the target NP and embedded verb attracted less attention from comprehenders
as that between the target NP and matrix verb.4 Importantly, the fact that coercion effects
emerged in SRCs rules out the possibility that information contained within an embedded
clause is generally processed at a shallower level (i.e., treated as presupposition rather than
“at issue”; not given as much attention as main clause information, etc.). This suggests
that the modulating effect of structural separation observed here and in previous work is
driven by the fact that in ORCs, the target NP serves as the argument to both the matrix
verb as well as the embedded verb, and thus, both relationship may not be given equal
weight during the course of interpretation.
In any case, the findings of this work indicate that the relative difficulty of processing
complex semantic expressions depends on the structure of the sentence in which they
appear. Moreover, the work presented in this thesis demonstrates that the modulating
effects of sentence structure holds for both Aspectual and Psychological verbs in the co-
ercion verbs set. In both cases, SRCs, which present coercive elements together within
the same clause, were at least as difficult to read as their ORC counterparts, despite the
well-established observation that the ORCs are more difficult to process. The fact that
the processing of ORCs was apparently not affected in the same way as that of the SRCs
suggests that the processing difficulty associated with complement coercion is sensitive to
the relationship between the coercing constituents and other elements in the sentence. Un-
derstanding what features coercive aspectual verbs have in common with coercive psycho-
4Such an explanation obviously disrespects strong compositionality as an inviolable property of natural
language; however, given the evidence discussed in §2, it’s not obvious the theory of semantic comprehension
that ultimately bares out should adhere to strong compositionality.
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logical verbs—that is, identifying which features appear to be relevant to the grammar—
remains an important area for future research.
Still, type-shifting accounts cannot escape the need to account for the fact that aspectual
verbs do not always obligatorily select for eventive arguments, and similarly do not always
give rise to eventive interpretations. One way of achieving this might be to adopt a
‘preference-based’ analysis of selectional restrictions, as proposed by Lowder and Gordon
(2016), however such an amendment would obviously require additional machinery for
determining an element’s preferred selectional restrictions. Similarly, such an account is
potentially challenged by findings that suggest the coercion effects are not modulated by
contextual manipulations, nor by differences based on the “preferability” of sentences (as
established via norming) (Frisson & McElree 2008).
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The present thesis has explored the principle of compositionality as it relates to natural
language, looking specifically at phenomena that appear to challenge standard views of
strong compositionality, such as complement coercion. I have explored various strongly
and weakly compositional theoretical treatments of complement coercion that have been
proposed in the literature, including both syntacticly and semantically oriented proposals.
Two competing proposals were identified as being most promising for accounting for the
phenomena of complement coercion—the Type-Shifting Hypothesis, and the Structured
Individuals Hypothesis—each of which make different predictions regarding the behavior
of distinct verb classes comprising the “coercion verbs” set. An experimental investiga-
tion into these competing predictions was conducted, and the results appear to favor the
Type-Shifting Hypothesis, which predicts uniform behavior across the two verb-classes in
question with regard to the processing of complement coercion phenomena.
In considering type-shifting approaches to complement coercion, two different propos-
als were reviewed: Pustejovsky’s (1995) Generative Lexicon Theory (Pustejovsky 1995),
and Jackendoff’s (1997) theory of Enriched Composition (Jackendoff 1997). While these
proposals are distinguishable on the basis of theoretical considerations, such as whether
common-sense knowledge is assumed to be a part of our semantic understanding of a
lexical item, the theories do not make different predictions that lend themselves obviously
to empirical testing.
The study reported here was designed to specifically test whether both Psychological
and Aspectual verbs identified in the coercion verbs set engender a similar processing cost
in complement coercion contexts–a distinction which tests competing predictions of the
SIH and the type-shifting approaches. As such, the present experiment does not speak to
the comparative tenability of one type-shifting approach over the other, but it does put us
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in a better position for exploring such considerations in the future.
Likewise, further research is necessary before the conclusiveness of the present findings
can be established, namely more controlled experimental investigations into the modulat-
ing effects of sentence structure, which internally include a control group in their design.
Likewise, further research into how these verb-classes behave across other structure-types
featuring clausal boundaries is prudent if a better understanding of the modulating effects
of sentence structure on complement coercion costs, as well as which lexical semantic
properties of these verb classes are relevant for argument selection, is to be achieved. This
also implies a need for further theoretical explorations into the roles decomposition and
discourse context play in argument selection, composition, and the interpretive accommo-
dation of arguments in coercive constructions.
APPENDIX
EXPERIMENTAL STIMULI
(1) a. The publisher that began the novel earned a great deal of money from advanced sales.
b. The novel that the publisher began earned a great deal of money from advanced sales.
c. The politician that resisted the bill earned nationwide support from Democratic voters.
d. The bill that the politician resisted earned nationwide support from Democratic voters.
(2) a. The editor that finished the newspaper received a Pulitzer Prize a couple of years ago.
b. The newspaper that the editor finished received a Pulitzer Prize a couple of years ago.
c. The lawyer that preferred the convertible attracted a lot of attention in the small town.
d. The convertible that the lawyer preferred attracted a lot of attention in the small town.
(3) a. The architect that finished the house included a large porch in the backyard that we all loved.
b. The house that the architect finished included a large porch in the backyard that we all loved.
c. The vacationer that enjoyed the pool warmed under the scorching heat of the afternoon sun.
d. The pool that the vacationer enjoyed warmed under the scorching heat of the afternoon sun.
(4) a. The farmer that started the fields produced corn, beans, and cucumbers later that year.
b. The fields that the farmer started produced corn, beans, and cucumbers later that year.
c. The tourist that enjoyed the wine arrived from a small town on the coast of California.
d. The wine that the tourist enjoyed arrived from a small town on the coast of California.
(5) a. The professor that finished the syllabus listed the dates of all the upcoming exams.
b. The syllabus that the professor finished listed the dates of all the upcoming exams.
c. The bartender that enjoyed the cigarette burned the old warehouse to the ground.
d. The cigarette that the bartender enjoyed burned the old warehouse to the ground.
(6) a. The auditor that began the taxes upset everyone at the firm.
b. The taxes that the auditor began upset everyone at the firm.
c. The athlete that endured the coach led the team to victory.
d. The coach that the athlete endured led the team to victory.
(7) a. The director that completed the script won the award for best screenplay.
b. The script that the director completed won the award for best screenplay.
c. The defendant that endured the lawyer made one final plea to the jury.
d. The lawyer that the defendant endured made one final plea to the jury.
(8) a. The woman that started the garden grew beautiful tulips and daffodils every spring.
b. The garden that the woman started grew beautiful tulips and daffodils every spring.
c. The dieter that resisted the cupcake sat in the foyer for the remainder of the party.
d. The cupcake that the dieter resisted sat in the foyer for the remainder of the party.
(9) a. The secretary that began the memo announced that there would be pay raises for all the employ-
ees.
b. The memo that the secretary began announced that there would be pay raises for all the employ-
ees.
c. The student that endured the textbook provided valuable insight into fixing the computer prob-
lems.
d. The textbook that the student endured provided valuable insight into fixing the computer prob-
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lems.
(10) a. The engineer that completed the memo outlined the details of the upcoming fundraiser.
b. The memo that the engineer completed outlined the details of the upcoming fundraiser.
c. The volunteer that enjoyed the soup soothed the sick and elderly people in the hospital.
d. The soup that the volunteer enjoyed soothed the sick and elderly people in the hospital.
(11) a. The teenager that continued the novel recounted terrifying stories of zombies and vampires.
b. The novel that the teenager continued recounted terrifying stories of zombies and vampires.
c. The policeman that tolerated the uniform carried several extra weapons needed for the job.
d. The uniform that the policeman tolerated carried several extra weapons needed for the job.
(12) a. The waitress that started the coffee greeted the customers as soon as they walked in the diner.
b. The coffee that the waitress started greeted the customers as soon as they walked in the diner.
c. The surfer that endured the tuxedo received more complements than anyone had anticipated.
d. The tuxedo that the surfer endured received more complements than anyone had anticipated.
(13) a. The builder that completed the house included a stunning balcony in the master bedroom.
b. The house that the builder completed included a stunning balcony in the master bedroom.
c. The catcher that tolerated the fans accused the new pitcher of trying to sabotage the game.
d. The fans that the catcher tolerated accused the new pitcher of trying to sabotage the game.
(14) a. The publisher that continued the manuscript described the current state of our political system.
b. The manuscript that the publisher continued described the current state of our political system.
c. The protester that resisted the handcuffs presented a hassle for the policeman making the arrest.
d. The handcuffs that the protester resisted presented a hassle for the policeman making the arrest.
(15) a. The journalist that completed the article accused the governor of embezzling millions of dollars.
b. The article that the journalist completed accused the governor of embezzling millions of dollars.
c. The bridesmaid that tolerated the dress resembled an old potato sack covered in lace and bows.
d. The dress that the bridesmaid tolerated resembled an old potato sack covered in lace and bows.
(16) a. The stylist that started the braid reminded me of a new hairstyle I saw in a magazine last week.
b. The braid that the stylist started reminded me of a new hairstyle I saw in a magazine last week.
c. The infant that resisted the peas created an enormous mess for the new babysitter to clean up.
d. The peas that the infant resisted created an enormous mess for the new babysitter to clean up.
(17) a. The artist that continued the portrait illustrated many important techniques to the art students.
b. The portrait that the artist continued illustrated many important techniques to the art students.
c. The nurse that preferred the velvet fascinated many of the patients in the hospital on Sunday.
d. The velvet that the nurse preferred fascinated many of the patients in the hospital on Sunday.
(18) a. The editor that finished the article revealed that the senator was involved in a big scandal.
b. The article that the editor finished revealed that the senator was involved in a big scandal.
c. The pilot that preferred the biplane soared high above the snowy mountains this morning.
d. The biplane that the pilot preferred soared high above the snowy mountains this morning.
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